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INTRODUCTION
Class actions have long been thought to raise acute principal-agent
issues  because  the  class  members  may have  little  control  over  the
actions of their representative  in the litigation.'  This concern arises
most prominently in the context of class action settlements.  A widely
recognized  risk  is  that the class  counsel  may in effect  "sell out" or
enter into a "collusive" settlement, thus yielding the class members an
amount  much  smaller  than  the  actual  value  of their  claims.'  A
number of recent class action settlements have prompted the charge
that the class  members  received only a small fraction  of what they
would have received (in expected terms)'  had the case gone to trial.4
Yet courts  understandably  are  reluctant  to  discourage  or  abandon
class  action  settlements  as  a means  for  resolving  large-scale  mass
disputes,  for the  simple  reason  that the  alternatives,  class  trials  or
1.  See Nancy Morawetz, Bargaining, Class  Representation, and Fairness,  54 OHIO ST. LJ. 1, 5
(1993);  Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An InstitutionalEvolutionist  Perspectiv  80 CORNELL L. REV.
941, 942  (1995).
2.  See genera/lyJohn C. Coffee,Jr.,  Class Wars:  The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM.  L. REV.  1343, 1367-75  (1995).
3.  Thai is, taking into account the possibility that they would have  lost at trial.
4.  SeeBarry Meier,  Fstful  ofCoupons: Milonsfor  Class-Action  Layers,  ScripforPlaintiffs,  N.Y.
TIMES, May  26, 1995, at DI; Richard B.  Schmitt, The Dealmakers:  Some Firms Embrace the Widely
Dreaded Class-Action Lawsuit, WALL  ST. J., July 18,  1996, at Al; Lawrence  W. Schonbrun,  Class
Actions:  The New EthicalFrontier,  CivilJustice Memo, Manhattan InstituteJudicial Studies Program
(Nov.  1996);  see also Coffee,  supra note 2, at 1359-61;  Susan P. Koniak & George  M.  Cohen,
Under  Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV.  1051,  1057 (1996);  Brian Wolfnan  & Alan B.  Morrison,
Representing the Unrepresented in Class  Actions Seeking Monetary Relief, 71  N.Y.U.  L. REV.  439, 441
(1996);  Morawetz,  supra note 1, at 5-7.
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individual litigation, generate enormous administrative costs that the
class members substantially bear themselves.'
Emblematic  of  this  dilemma  is  the  debate  over  the  so-called
"settlement class action" that has recently been waged before both the
Supreme  Court6  and  the  drafters  of  the  Federal  Rules  of  Civil
Procedure.  With this device,  courts simultaneously certify a class in,
and approve a classwide settlement of, a set of suits brought by a large
group of plaintiffs.'  This occurs  even though the suits might not be
amenable  to class  certification for purposes of trial.  Proponents  of
the settlement  class  action  tout  its  efficiency;  it saves  the  costs  of
resolving thousands of suits that would have to be litigated separately
were the device unavailable.9  Opponents of the procedure argue that
it is  peculiarly  susceptible  to  the  problem  of collusive  settlement
because the defendant in effect "handpicks" the class counsel.1 0
The principal-agent problem hardly is  confined to the settlement
class action context, however.  In any class action setting, there exists
the temptation  for the defendant and the class  counsel to strike  a
bargain  in which  the  class  counsel, for a price,  agrees  to settle the
case on terms relatively disadvantageous to the class members.  The
class  members  are often  unable  to  protect  themselves  against  this
danger;  and  courts,  in  policing  settlements  to  safeguard  the  class
members'  interests,  frequently  lack  the  information  necessary  to
5.  See Note,  Class Certification in Mass Accident Cases Under  Rule 23(b)(1), 96 HARv.  L. REV.
1143, 1144-45  (1983).
6.  In  Amdzem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231,  2244 (1997),  the Supreme Court
disallowed  class certification  in a mass settlement of current and future  claims for asbestos-
related injury, on  the grounds  that the proposed  class failed to  satisfy Federal  Rule  of Civil
Procedure 23's issue commonality and adequacy of representation requirements.  The Court did
not address the circumstances in which a class might be certified for purposes of settlement even
though it could not be certified for purposes  of trial.  See id. at 2247-48.
7.  A proposed amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly authorizes
class certification for purposes of  settlement in cases inappropriate for a class trial.  SeeProposed
Amendment  to  Federal  Rules  of Civil  Procedure,  167  F.R.D.  559, 559  (1996)  (proposing
amendment to FED. R  CrV. P. 23(b) (4)).
8.  See Note, Back to the Drawing  Board:  The Settlement Class Action and  Limits of  Rule 23, 109
HARv.  L. REv.  828, 829  (1996)  (describing procedure  of settlement class actions).  See generally
Roger C. Cramton, IndividualizedJustice,  Mass Torts, and "Settlement Class  Actions": An Introduction,
80 CoRNELL L. REV. 811, 823 (1995)  (defining settlement class action as device "designed to be
settled  rather  than  litigated,  with  the  defendant not objecting  to  certification  of the  class
providing the settlement is approved").
9.  See, eg., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc.,  157 F.R.D. 246,316  (E.D. Pa. 1994),  vacated,
83  F.3d 610  (3d Cir. 1996),  aff'd sub nom. Amchem  Prods.,  Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S.  Ct. 2231
(1997).
10.  See In reAsbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963, 988 (5th Cir. 1996); Coffee, supra  note 2, at 1378;
Letter from Steering Committee to Oppose Rule 23  (June 1, 1996)  (on file with author).  The
settlement struck down  in Amdm had been criticized extensively for its alleged collusiveness.
See  ag,  Coffee, supra, at 1373-75  &  n.110;  Susan P.  Koniak,  Feasting While the Widow  Weeps:
Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L  REv. 1045, 1048  (1995); Koniak & Cohen,
supra  note 4, at 1113.THE AMERICAN  UNIVERSITY  LAW REVEW  [Vol. 46:1429
detect instances in which  the  class members  are receiving  less than
their  claims  are  worth.  Yet  prohibiting  or discouraging  classwide
settlements scarcely is desirable from the class members'  standpoint
because  the cost  savings  resulting from  settlement  benefit them  as
much  as  anyone  else.  Therefore, regardless of how the controversy
over settlement class actions is resolved, there will remain the tension
between reaping the cost savings that class settlements promise while
at the same time protecting the class members from being sold out in
the process.
This Article examines how to mediate this conflict through judicial
regulation of class counsels'  fees.  The Article's central theme is that
proper regulation of the counsel's fee is both necessary, and within
limits,  sufficient  to  mediate  the  tension  between  the  goals  of
facilitating settlement and protecting the class against collusion.  On
the one hand,  effective fee regulation  is a prerequisite for avoiding
collusive  settlements; in many settings, alternatives to fee regulation
may furnish only weak protection for the class.  On the other hand,
proper regulation  of the  counsel's  fee  can largely protect the  class
against  collusive  settlements  without  blocking  class  settlements
altogether.  In other words, effective  regulation  of the counsel's fee
in  class  settlements  makes  it  possible  to  capture  the  benefits  of
settlement, such  as reduced administrative  costs, without sacrificing
the interests of the class members as a group.
To  develop  this  argument,  this Article  analyzes  a fee  regulation
technique  by which the court "caps" the counsel's fee so that it does
not exceed a certain  percentage  of the amount the  class receives."
The use of a percentage-of-the-recovery  system is of course not new;
it figures  prominently in  existing  court fee  award  practices. 2  The
11.  See infra Parts  IV-VI.
12.  In early class action practice,  courts typically calculated the counsel's fee on a simple
percentage-of-the  award basis.  See ARTHUR R.  MILLER,  ATTORNEY's  FEES  IN CLASS  ACTIONS:  A
REPORT  TO THE FEDERALJUDICIAL  CENTER  23 (1980);John  P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary
Clients in Public  Interest Litigation, 88 HARV. L  REv. 849,876 (1975)  (remarking how percentage-
of-benefit formula to determine attorneys' fees has assumed prominence in past twenty years).
Since  the  mid-1970s,  many  courts  have  preferred  to  employ  an  hourly-rate  formula.  In
employing this method, however, courts apparently often  check the result against an implicit
percentage-of-the  award baseline, and generally award between  20% and 30% of the recovery.
See 1 ALBA CONTE, ATTORNEY FEE AwARDs 51-52  (2d ed. 1993); WilliamJ. Lynk,  The Courts and
the Plantiffs'Bar Awarding  the Aory's  Fee in Class-Action Litigation, 23J. LEGAL STUD.  185,  209
(1994);  Thomas  E.  Willging et al.,  An Empirical  Analysis of Rule  23  to Address the Rulemaking
Challenges,  71  N.Y.U. L  REv. 74, 155-65  (1996).  As one court has observed,  "[W]hat is curious
is that whatever method is used and no matter what billing records are submitted to [the court],
the result  is  an  award  that almost  always  hovers around  30%  of the  fund  created  by  the
settlement."  In re Activision Sec.  Litig., 723  F. Supp.  1373, 1375  (N.D.  Cal.  1989);  see also 1
CONTE, supra, at 51-52 (noting that attorney's recovery may be closer to 5% or 10% in very large
class recoveries).
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key, however, is  to  identify the  right  percentage  to  award.  If the
percentage  is too high, class counsel will have an incentive  to settle
the case for too little; if the percentage  is too low, the  case may not
settle at all.  The optimal percentage may differ dramatically among
cases and among lawyers.  This Article's intended contribution  is to
derive the structure of the optimal fee cap and show how it would be
determined in practice.
Attorney's fees often occupy center stage in studies of the problem
of class action settlements.  Among critics, the contention  that class
members have received too little in a class settlement almost always is
accompanied by the corresponding charge that the class' counsel has
received  too much;  in  other words,  the settlement has  resulted in
handsome  fees  for  the  lawyers  but inadequate  relief for  the  class
members. 3  Courts, also, worry that the prospect of earning a "juicy"
fee  in  settlement  may give  class  counsel an  interest in  settling  on
terms unfavorable to the class. 4  As a result, courts devote  consider-
able energy to scrutinizing the counsel's fee in settlement to ensure
it is  "reasonable"  rather  than  "excessive"  compensation.15  Yet  it
appears that no court or commentator systematically has investigated
how the counsel's fee should be structured in order to give her the
proper incentives in negotiating a class settlement. 6
13.  The titles of recent articles capture this concern quite vividly.  See Dawson, supra note
12  ("Lawyers  and Involuntary  Clients  in  Public Interest  Litigation");  Koniak,  supra note  10
("Feasting While the Widow Weeps"); Meier, supra  note 4 ("Millions for Class-Action Lawyers,
Scrip for Plaintiffs");  see also MILLER,  supra  note 12,  at 296.
14.  SeeAlleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327,347 (2d Cir.  1964) (FriendlyJ.,  dissenting)
("[A] juicy  bird  in  the  hand  is  worth  more than  the  vision  of a  much  larger  one  in  the
bush .... ").  For more recent expressions of this concern, see General Motors Corp. v. Bloyed,
916 S.W.2d 949, 954 (Tex. 1996); In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods.
Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768,  801-05  (3d Cir. 1995),  cert. denied, 116 S. CL  88  (1995); In re General
Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1131  (7th Cir. 1979).
15.  See MILLER,  supra note 12,  at 74-185;  1 CoNTE,  supra note 12, at 50-55.  See generally
Report of the Third Circuit Task Force,  Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D.  237  (1985).
16.  Previous  analyses have shown  that the prevailing methods  of calculating  fee awards,
awarding either an hourly rate or a fixed percentage of the recovery, may lead counsel to settle
for too  little.  See John  C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding  the PlaintifJ's  Attorney:  The Implications of
Economic Themy for Private  Enforcement of Law through Class and Derivative  Actions, 86 COLUM.  L
REV.  669, 717 (1986);Jonathan  R.  Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attornes  Role in
Class  Action and  Derivative  Litigation: Economic  Analysis and  Recommendations  for  Reform,  58 U. CHI.
L. REv.  1,22-23  (1991)  (discussing incentives for plaintiffs' attorneys to settle for lesser amounts
on  eve  of trial in order  to guarantee  benefits  while  downsizing  risks);  see also In re General
Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d at 802.  These studies have
generally not examined  designing the fee to avoid this difficulty.  See Macey  & Miller, supra, at
105-16 (urging the auction of  plaintiffs'  claims to lawyers, thereby eliminating the need for a fee
at all);  see also Coffee, supra, at 692.
One exception  is Kevin M. Clermont &John D.  Currivan, Improving on the Contingent  Fee, 63
CORNELL  L. REv.  529, 530  (1978),  who urge a hybrid hourly-rate/percentage-of-the-award  fee
as a means of solving the principal-agent problem in settlement.  See id. at 530.  Their analysis,
however, does not take into account the choice between settling and going to trial; indeed, theirTHE AMERICAN  UNIVERSITY  LAw REvIEw  [Vol. 46:1429
The  absence  of  systematic  analysis  of  this  design  problem  has
produced  two consequences, both potentially unfortunate.  First,  it
has led courts  to focus on the wrong matters in regulating counsel's
fee  in  class  settlements.  Proper  regulation  of the  fee  requires  the
court to adopt an  ex ante perspective on settlement negotiations.  In
essence, the court must ask how counsel's anticipated fee determines
her settlement demands.  The conventional  practice  of the courts,
however, is to look at the fee award in purely expost terms.  They ask,
in essence, whether a fee award represents a fair distributional share
of the amount obtained, taking the settlement amount as given, and
whether the counsel is being overpaid for the work she invested in the
case."  When the objective is to protect the class against inadequate
settlements, these are the wrong questions to ask and they frequently
yield the wrong answers.  A fee calculation system yielding awards that
seem  entirely  appropriate  when  viewed  ex  post may,  nonetheless,
encourage  counsel  to settle for much less than the  case  is worth to
the  class."  This may well justify critics' fears that class members are
shortchanged under the current system.
Second,  the  lack  of systematic  analysis  of fee  design  may  have
fostered undue skepticism toward the use of class actions as a device
for resolving  large-scale  disputes.  Some  courts  and  commentators
have advocated more sparing use of the class action, particularly  the
settlement  class  action,  out  of  a  fear  of  collusive  settlements.1 9
Perhaps there are some inherent problems with the class action that
warrant  restricting  its  use,'°  but  the  unavoidability  of  collusive settlements is not one of them.  The problem of collusive settlement
assumption  is that there is no alternative to settling.  As a result, their solution is not designed
to ensure  that the  plaintiffs  receive  as much  in  settlement  as  they would  if there  was  no
settlement.  In fact, their proposal would provide no such assurance.  To protect the plaintiffs
against this danger, the fee must give the counsel no more than  the fraction specified in Part
V of this Article.
17.  See 1  CONTE, supra  note 12, at 45-60  (providing survey and summary of courts' emphasis
on ensuring that counsel's fee is appropriate in relation to amount class receives and amount
of work done).
18.  See infra note 139 and accompanying text.  This point is pursued at greater length in
a separate essay.  SeeBruce L Hay, Asymmetric Rewards:  Why Class Actions (May) Settlefor Too Litt1
48 HASTINGS  LJ. 479,  481-82  (1997).
19.  See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d at
801-03; Bloyed  916 S.W.2d at 952-54;  Coffee,  supra  note 2, at 1373-74.
20.  Some voice  concern,  for example,  that the  class action  may  be used  as a blackmail
device to extort unjustified payments from the defendants.  See In rRhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.,
51 F.3d  1293, 1298 (7th Cir.),  cert. denied!  116 S. Ct. 184 (1995).  Other common concerns are
that use of the class action device produces excessive  costs and is unfair to individual litigants.
SeeBarry F. McNeil &  Beth L. Fancsali, Mass Torts and  Class Actions:  FacingIncreased  Scrutiny, 167
F.R.D. 483, 490-91  (1996); David Rosenberg, IndividualJustice  and  Collectiviting  Risk-Based Claims
in Mass-Easure  Cases, 71  N.Y.U. L. REv. 210, 252 (1996).  These issues are not addressed in this
Article.
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can be fixed without jettisoning the  class action  device, thus making
it possible  to reap  the potential  benefits of class treatment without
shortchanging the  class in settlement.
To be sure, fee regulation is not a magic potion guaranteeing that
class members will never come up short in settlement. For instance,
getting the counsel's fee 'just right" would require the court to know,
among other things,  the value of the  class members'  claims.21  Yet
the problem  of collusive settlements  arises precisely because  courts
lack  this  information.  If  the  court  knew  the  value  of the  class
members'  claims,  preventing settlements  that offered  less than that
amount would be  a trivial problem.22  The most we can  ask of the
optimal fee regulation  system is  that it will get things approximately
right and generally counteract any incentive to settle for less than the
case is worth, without discouraging settlement altogether.
Another,  perhaps  more  important,  difficulty  involves  protecting
individual members or subsets of a class.  The fee-capping technique
can ensure, in principle, that the class counsel does not shortchange
the group in settlement.  It does not, however, solve the problem of
dividing that recovery among the  class members.  To the extent the
class  is heterogeneous, in  that some members  have stronger  claims
than  others,2 "  the  fee  cap  does  not  necessarily  ensure  that each
subclass will  get the full value  of its  claims.24  Thus,  the technique
examined here should be understood to offer protection to the group
as a whole, but not necessarily to each member of the group.25
Part I of this Article furnishes a brief overview of the problem and
provides  five  major  analytical  conclusions.  Part II  describes  the
framework  for  analysis,  specifying  the  court's  objective  in  fee
regulation and the constraints under which it is assumed to operate.
The analysis then proceeds in five stages.  In Part III, the theoretical
basis for capping the class counsel's fee in settlement is examined by
describing the incentives that would exist if the court did not regulate
the  fee.  In  Part  IV, the  effects  that  a  policy  capping  the  class
counsel's fee creates on settlement behavior are discussed.
21.  See infraPartV.
22.  Because court approval is a prerequisite to effecting a settlement, courts could solve the
problem by vetoing inadequate settlements.  See infra Part V.
23.  If all class members are identical, an equal  division of the recovery presumably solves
the distribution problem.
24.  See infra Part VII.
25.  For an argument that class action rules should be concerned primarily with protection
of the class as an entity, rather than with protection of individual  class members, see David L.
Shapiro,  Class Actions:  The Class as Party and Clien, 40 ARIZ.  L. REv.  (forthcoming 1997).
1435THE AMERICAN  UNIVERSITY  LAW  REVIEW  [Vol. 46:1429
This Article then focuses on the problem of designing the appropri-
ate  fee  cap.  In  Part V, the  basic  structure  of the  optimal  cap  is
derived.  This analysis includes a discussion of the proper percentage
to award  counsel  and the central factors affecting  the optimal  cap.
Part VI  addresses  how  the  court would,  in  practice,  estimate  the
optimal  cap  in  a  given  case.  Finally,  in  Part  VII,  this  analysis  is
extended  to settlements  involving subclasses,  and the  limitations  of
the Article's prescriptions when a single counsel represents more than
one subclass are investigated.
One further prefatory note may be in order. The analysis to follow
employs a cold-blooded assessment of attorney incentives in the class
settlement process.  It focuses on the financial payoffs facing the class
counsel and proceeds on the assumption that these payoffs influence
her decisions.  This does not deny that ethical  considerations will, in
many cases, lead counsel to act in the class's interests even if it is not
in her financial interest.  Nonetheless, it is probably inappropriate  to
have the attorney's financial interest conflict with the class's interests,
so  that she  must choose  between  her own  welfare  and that of her
client.  The  purpose  is  simply  to align,  to  the extent possible,  the
attorney's financial interests with those of the class in the settlement
process.
I.  THE FEE  REGULATION  PROBLEM
A.  The Potential  for Collusion
The  central  agency  problem  in  class  action  settlements  may  be
stated  simply.  There  is  some  amount  of money  that  the  class
members will recover, in expected terms, from the defendant if the
case  goes  to  trial.  The  defendant  and  the  class  counsel  have  a
financial incentive  to split that amount between themselves by settling the
case and giving the class members as little as possible.26  That is, the
defendant  and  the  class  counsel  will  be  tempted  to  enter  into  a
settlement that leaves both class counsel and the defendant better off
than if they went to trial, at the expense of the class members.
Consider the following  example.  A class  of plaintiffs  brings suit
against  a defendant  If the case  goes  to trial,  the  class  expects  to
recover  $100  million.  Assume  the  class  counsel  will  recover,  in
expected  terms, profits of $5  million.  There will exist an enormous
temptation for the defendant and the class counsel  to "sell out" the
26.  See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Setemen4 16J. LEGAL STUD.  189,
200  (1987).
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class members, that is, to enter into a settlement that gives the class
less than $100  million.  The defendant and class counsel  might, for
example, agree to a settlement that gives the class counsel a payment
of $10  million, but gives only $50 million to the class members.  Such
a  settlement would place  the  class counsel  and the defendant in  a
much better position financially than if the case went to trial.
This risk of collusion arises out of the divergent interests between
the class members and the class  counsel.  Because  the class counsel
does not "own" the class's claims,  she has no incentive  to maximize
the class's return on the claims.  This problem may arise, of course,
in any litigation setting.1 7  Three factors, however, make it particular-
ly acute in the  class action context.
First, there is no contractual relation between principal and agent.
The class  typically does not "hire" class counsel.2"  As a result, class
members  cannot  contractually  protect  themselves.  They  cannot
structure  the counsel's fee in a way that ensures she will act in their
interests.29  Class  counsel, therefore, has no contractual incentive  to
maximize  the class's recovery.
Second, the  court, which is  responsible  for protecting the  class's
interests,30 has  only limited ability to detect a collusive  settlement.'
When called upon to approve the settlement, the court may be highly
uncertain  about the aggregate value of the class's claims, such as the
number of claimants and the strength of their claims. 3 2  In addition,
the  court may have  difficulty  assessing  the  true value of the settle-
ment,  that  is,  determining  how much  the plaintiffs  will  be  paid.3
Under these  conditions, the court might approve a settlement that,
27.  See id. at 201.
28.  Some  class  members  may have hired  the class  counsel  as their personal  lawyer, but
generally not all of them.
29.  Similarly, class members cannot choose, from a group of competing lawyers, the best
contractual  terms.
30.  See FED.  R. Civ. P. 23(d)-(e).  Most states have analogous provisions.
31.  See RicHARD  A. POSNER,  ECONOMIC  ANALYsIs OF LAW 570 (4th ed. 1992).
32.  See idL  This  is particularly true in the  context of settlement class  actions.  See Coffee,
supra  note 2, at 1380; FEDERALJUDICIAL  CENTER,  MANUAL  FOR COMPLEx LITIGATION THIRD  243-
44 (1995).
33.  In many settlement agreements, the defendant  creates a settlement fund to pay  the
plaintiffs.  Rigid eligibility requirements,  however, may exist that prevent many plaintiffs from
collecting from the fund.  These unclaimed funds would revert to the defendant.  The court
may have difficulty assessing how onerous  the eligibility requirements  will  be in practice, and
thus, may have  difficulty ascertaining  how much will  actually go to the plaintiffs rather than
revert back to the defendant.  See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1377.  Problems of determining a
settlement's value also arise when it consists of nonmonetary relief, such as vouchers or coupons
toward the purchase  of some product, typically the defendant's.
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unbeknownst  to the  court, gives  the  class  less than  the value  of its
claims. 3 4
Third, the class members only have limited ability to veto or opt out
of  any  settlement  that  gives  them  less  than  the  value  of  their
claims. 3 5  Sometimes  class  members  lack  the information  to  assess
either the value of their claims or the quality of the settlement; 6  in
other instances, the period for opting out may have passed when the
settlement is entered. 7
An essential premise of this Article  is that these factors yield a non-
negligible incentive for collusive settlements.  The magnitude of this
incentive  is  debatable.  In  many  settings,  class  counsel's  financial
interests  may not diverge substantially from the  class members, 3 8 or
the threat of  judicial scrutiny or class opt out will discipline  the class
counsel and defendant.  For present purposes, it is enough to say that
the potential incentive for collusion is substantial.
B.  The Role of  Fee Regulation
The object of this Part is to determine how to counteract the non-
negligible  incentive  for  collusion  settlements  through  judicial
regulation of the fee that class counsel receives.  Because five major
conclusions  will  emerge  from  the  analysis,  it  may  be  helpful  to
summarize  them briefly. 3 9
1.  Basis  for a  fee cap
Where the incentive for collusive settlement is present, appropriate
fee regulation is essential to protect the class.  To illustrate this point,
it suffices  to ask:  What would happen in an environment where the
court did not regulate  the class counsel's fee?  In that environment,
class counsel and the defendant would have ajoint incentive to settle
for the minimum amount the court permitted.  That is,  they would
have  a joint incentive  to  arrive  at a settlement  that gave  the  class
34.  It is sometimes argued thatjudges, hoping to ease their workload, are willing to approve
a settlement they believe is inadequate.  I put this contention aside; whether it is true or not has
no bearing on  the analysis  to follow.
35.  See generally George Rutherglen, BetterLate than  Never:. Notice and Opt Out at the Settlement
Stage of Class  Actions, 71 N.Y.U.  L. REv. 258, 290  (1996).
36.  See  Schuck,  supra note  1,  at  964-66;  Wolfman  &  Morrison,  supra note  4,  at  441
(discussing  how lack of information among  plaintiffs mandates protection for class  members
whose  interests do  not coincide  with  those  of class  representatives  and  class attorneys).  An
extreme example arises in mass tort cases involving future claims of injury.  Class members may
not be aware of their claim or what they will receive under the settlement.  See i&, at 451-53.
37.  See Rutherglen, supra note 35, at 261.
38.  For example, perhaps the class counsel wants  to develop a professional reputation for
effectiveness, which encourages him to obtain large  recoveries.
39.  For development of these points, see infra Part III.
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members the "bare minimum" that the court would approve.  From
the standpoint of the defendant and class counsel, no financial reason
would exist to give the class members more than that.  Any putative
settlement that gave  the class  members more than  the "bare mini-
mum" would, in the defendant's and class counsel's view, be a waste;
they  could  split  between  themselves  any  excess  over  the  "bare
minimum."  As a result, the class members would tend to collect too
little on average, for two independent reasons.  First, courts systemati-
cally  may  tend  to  underestimate  the  value  of the  class's  claims,
thereby making the "bare minimum" too low.  Second, settlement is
likely to occur when this underestimation  occurs.
2.  Effects of a  fee cap
A rule that "caps" the class counsel's fee at a specified percentage
of the  amount paid to the class  members  can suppress the settling
parties' joint incentive to choose the minimum allowable amount for
the class.  For the class counsel to accept, a settlement must give her
at least as much as she would get if she refused  to settle.  The lower
that cap is, the larger the settlement amount must be in order for her
to find it acceptable.  Thus, the court's imposition of a fee cap on the
class counsel encourages  her to "hold out" for a relatively generous
settlement.  If the fee  cap  is  too low, however, counsel's minimum
demand will exceed the maximum amount the defendant will pay to
settle, thereby making settlement infeasible.  Thus, the court's task is
to make  the fee  cap  high  enough  to facilitate  settlement,  but low
enough to discourage  the class counsel from accepting a settlement
that gives the class less than the value of its claims. 4"
3.  Structure of the optimal  fee cap
The  optimal  fee  cap  is defined just low  enough  to  ensure  that
counsel  will  reject  any  settlement  offer  that would  give  the  class
members less than the value of their claims.  The value of the fee cap
depends on how much counsel would have received if there had been
no  class  settlement.  In  particular,  her  share  of  the  settlement
normally should be no greater than the share of the class members'
recovery she would have received if there had been no class settlement.
This represents  only an approximation  of the optimal  fee cap,  and
the precise  location will depend on a variety of additional factors."
40.  See infra Part V.
41.  These factors include the relative costs of settling against not settling, and risk aversion.
See Koniak & Cohen, supra  note 4, at 1115-16.
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If the cap is set at this approximate point, however, settlement should:
(1) generally be feasible; and (2)  give the class members at least what
they would have received if there had been no class settlement. 42
4.  Identifying the optimal  fee cap
If the foregoing is correct, then even if the court does not know the
value of the class members claims, in principle, it can ensure that the
class members receive the full value in settlement.  The task of a court
in  this  situation  is  to  estimate  the  share  of  the  class  members'
recovery  that the counsel  would  have  collected had  there been  no
class  settlement.  Multiplying  the  following  two  factors  roughly
produces  that share:  (1)  the  fraction  of  the  class  members  the
counsel would have represented if there had been no class settlement;
and  (2)  the fraction of each client's recovery the counsel would have
taken as her fee.  The former factor may be quite small,  particularly
in  the context  of settlement  class actions.  The upshot is  that the
optimal fee cap may also be small, possibly a fraction of one percent.
It is likely to be larger in the context of conventional trial class actions
that settle.
5.  Subclasses and the poblem of distribution
The  fee  cap applied  to  class  counsel should be  uniform, in  the
sense that she  collects  the same percentage  of each  class member's
recovery.  This is true because under a non-uniform cap,  she would
have an incentive to secure  larger settlements for the class members
to whom the relatively high cap applied; the remaining class members
would  get the minimum  allowable  settlement amount.43  Under  a
uniform  fee cap,  however, the counsel  is  largely  indifferent  to  the
distribution  of the  settlement  recovery.  As  a  result,  there  is  no
assurance that each class member will get the full value of her claim.
While the class as a whole will receive the full value of its claim, some
class members may ultimately receive  too much, while others receive
too little.  Because of counsel's indifference  to distribution,  there is
probably a structural bias toward overpaying plaintiffs with relatively
weak claims and underpaying those with  relatively strong claims.
42.  But see infra Part III (qualifying  these generalizations).
43.  In other words, if class counsel  receives  10%  of group A's  recovery but only 5%  of
group B's recovery, counsel and the defendant would have ajoint incentive  to give group B as
little as possible.
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II.  ANALYnCAL  FRAMEWORK
A.  A  Simple Model
The  following  simple  model  will  be  used  to  analyze  the  fee
regulation  problem.  Assume  a business  firm  markets  a  defective
product that causes injury to a large number of individuals.  Some or
all of the victims sue the firm for compensation.  The defendant seeks
to enter into a "classwide settlement" to extinguish the claims.
Classwide
settlement
Court reviews
proposed settlement
Defendant
negotiates with
representative(s)
No classwide
settlement
Figure 1 depicts the sequence  of events in the settlement process.
First, the defendant,  together with counsel  or potential counsel  for
the  class  of plaintiffs,  negotiates  the  terms  of a possible  classwide
settlement.  Second,  if the  defendant  and  class  counsel  agree  on
terms, they submit the proposed settlement to the court for approval.
Third, if the court approves the settlement, it becomes effective  and
extinguishes  the  class  members'  claims.  If the defendant and  the
class counsel do not agree on terms, or if the court does not approve
the terms on which they agree, there is no classwide settlement.
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1.  Negotiation  process
The class representative in the negotiations is a lawyer hired by one
or more of the victims to handle individual  claims.  There is a pool
of potential class counsel called "candidates."  This example assumes
the candidates  differ in the amount they stand to  receive from  the
case if there is no class settlement.'  There are two possible bargain-
ing scenarios.  Both differ in  the manner  and timing by which  the
class representative  is chosen:
In the first scenario, the court has exclusively designated an official
class  counsel before  settlement negotiations  have  concluded.  The
defendant cannot choose his negotiating partner; he is forced to deal
with the designated class counsel.  There is no classwide settlement if
the  defendant  fails  to  reach  agreement  with  the  designated  class
counsel.
In  the  second  scenario,  no  class  counsel  has  been  officially,
exclusively  designated  at  the  time  settlement  negotiations  have
concluded.  Instead,  the  defendant  may  negotiate  with  several
different lawyers,  each hoping to represent the class.  The lawyer who
successfully  negotiates  a  settlement  and  secures  judicial  approval
becomes  class counsel.  In effect, the defendant can seek competitive
bids from different "candidates" and enter into an agreement with the
one offering the most attractive settlement terms.
This latter scenario may materialize in several ways.  One possibility
is that the case is in the early stages of becoming a conventional  trial
class action, but no one has been designated  counsel for the entire
class.  A court may not have certified the class or several courts may
have  separately  certified  the  class,  each  naming  a  different  class
counsel.'  Another possibility  is  that the  case will  never become  a
trial  class  action;  there  is  simply a set of separate  actions  that  the
defendant seeks to resolve by consolidating  them into a "settlement
class action."
2.  Settlement terms
For the purposes of this Article, a classwide settlement has two basic
components.  First, it determines  how  much  the  class  counsel  will
44.  These differences  will reflect variations in the quantity or relative merits of the claims
each lawyer  is handling in the litigation.
45.  See Coffee, supra  note 2, at 1370  (noting phenomenon in class action litigation known
as "reverse  auction" in  which there  is "jurisdictional competition  among different  teams  of
plaintiff's attorneys in different actions that involve the same underlying allegations"); Geoffrey
P. Miller,  Overlapping Class  Actions, 71  N.Y.U. L. REV.  514, 516  (1996).
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collect  as  her fee for negotiating  the settlement.  Second, it deter-
mines the amount that will be distributed to the class.  As these terms
are central to the following analysis, simple notations will be used for
brevity.  Let
F  =  the fee paid to the class counsel;
S  =  the total amount distributed  to the  class members,
net of the fee paid to the  class counsel.
It should be emphasized that S represents  the amount actually paid
to the class members after any deductions are made to pay the class
counsel.  In other words,  S is the aggregate  amount that goes into
"the pockets" of the class members, and possibly their own personal
lawyers,46 rather than into "the pockets" of class counsel.
In negotiating a settlement, one  assumes  that the defendant and
the class  counsel bargain over, and submit to the court, a proposed
value  of  S and  F.  This  is  not  necessarily  explicit.47   A proposed
settlement may  simply  specify  the  total  amount to  be  paid to  the
defendant, leaving the court to divide this amount between the  class
counsel and the  class members."  Even in such an instance,  howev-
er, the settling parties  will  have  some  expectations  about  how the
court will  divide  the settlement  amount between  counsel  and the
class.  These  expectations  will,  in  turn,  influence  the  amount the
parties settle for. Thus, the parties bargain implicitly, if not explicitly,
over the amount the class members ultimately will receive.
An example clarifies this point.  Suppose the court will permit class
counsel to collect a fee equal to 25% of the amount distributed to the
class.49  Equivalently, the court will permit the class counsel to collect
20%  of the total amount the defendant will pay." °  Assume that the
46.  Individual class members may have their own lawyers.  These lawyers may collect as part
of a privately negotiated fee agreement some portion of the amount paid to their clients.  See
Judith Resnik et al.,  Individuals Wthin the Aggregate:  Relationships, Rresentation, and Fees, 71
N.Y.U. L. REv.  296, 312-13  (1996).  This division of the proceeds from the settlement between
lawyer and client is irrelevant to this analysis because it does not raise any problems specific to
the class action setting.
47.  Courts frequently discourage fee discussions in the settlement process.  SeeMiller, supra
note 27, at 204.
48.  This is the apportionment process that occurs when the counsel's fee is deducted from
the  class  recovery.  See In re Warner  Communications  Sec.  Litig.,  618  F. Supp.  735,  749-50
(S.D.N.Y. 1985)  (reviewing fee awards in securities class action suits in Second Circuit), aff'd, 798
F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986).
49.  Expressed another way, the court will let F= 0.25S.
50.  If counsel receives 20% of the amount the defendant pays, that leaves 80% for the class
members.  Thus counsel is receiving one-fourth .(25%)  of the class members'  award.
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defendant offers to settle the case for a total payment of 200.51  This
is equivalent  to offering a value of 160  for S and  40 for F. 2  Once
the settling parties know what percentage of the settlement the court
will permit counsel to collect as her fee, any proposed total settlement
amount can  be converted  into a  corresponding  value of S and  F.
Therefore, one  can think of the defendant and the class counsel  as
bargaining  over, and proposing to the court, the value  of these  two
terms.
For similar reasons, it makes no difference whether one thinks  of
the class members as paying the counsel's fee, which is deducted from
their recovery,  or the  defendant  as  paying  it on top  of the  class's
recovery.  This will  have  no bearing  on  the ultimate  terms  of the
settlement  because  the  settling  parties  will  adjust  their  behavior
depending on the fee award policy.  Returning to the example above,
assume that the maximum amount the defendant will pay to settle the
case is 200.  If the fee is deducted from the class's recovery, then the
defendant will offer the class no more than 200; yielding 160 for the
class members and 40 for the class counsel.  If, instead, the defendant
pays the fee on top of the class's recovery, the defendant will offer the
class no more than 160; yielding, once again, 160 for the class and 40
for the  class  counsel.  Thus,  it makes  no  difference  whether  the
defendant formally pays the counsel's fee or the class members pay it
from their recovery; the amount that the class and counsel ultimately
receives will generally be the same in either event.
3.  Disposition of case
If the court approves a proposed settlement, the model assumes the
settlement goes into effect and all claims  are extinguished.  On the
other hand, if there  is  no  classwide settlement,  either because  the
defendant cannot agree on terms with counsel or the court does not
approve the agreed-upon  terms, then the claims must be resolved in
another manner. The claims may be resolved in a class-action  trial or
on a claim-by-claim basis, either through individual trials or individual
settlements.  No  assumptions  are  made  on  the  alternatives  to  a
classwide  settlement.  For  our  purposes,  it  makes  no  difference.
51.  Small numbers  are used to keep computations simple.  The relevant units of measure
might be in thousands or millions of dollars.  It makes no difference for present purposes.
52.  Counsel would receive  25% of 160, or 40.  Adding this number  to the 160 the  class
received produces a total of 200.
53.  In practice,  the  parties  may not know what fee  the court  will  allow,  but this  is not
relevant for purposes  of this  analysis.  The  objective  is to understand  the  optimal fee award
policy.  Under the optimal policy, the settling parties will know what fee the court will allow.
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These alternatives simply will be lumped together under the heading
"alternative proceedings."
B.  The Court's Objectives
In  reviewing  a proposed  classwide  settlement,  it is  assumed  the
court's primary  objective is to ensure  that the  class receives  the full
value of its claims.  More precisely, the court wants the value of S to
be at least as high as the expected amount the class members would
receive in an "alternative proceeding." 54  Note that this analysis is not
concerned with how the settlement amount is distributed  among the
class members.  The exclusive  focus is on the size  of the settlement
amount to be distributed. 55
Provided  that  this  goal  can  be  satisfied,  we  assume  the  court's
second  objective  is  for  a class  settlement to  occur. 56  Perhaps the
court wishes to reduce litigation costs, preserve judicial resources, or
quickly  compensate  the  class.  The  reason  is  unimportant  in  the
analysis to follow.  Suffice it to say that the court wants to encourage
class settlements provided the court's primary objective  is satisfied.
C.  Constraints
In pursuing  its  objectives,  the  court must  act under  three  basic
constraints.  The first constraint is that class counsel acts to maximize
her net return  from  the case.  In particular, it is  assumed  that in
choosing among a range of possible  settlements,  the counsel selects
the one that offers  her the  highest payment.  Thus, in settling the
case, counsel seeks to maximize F, the fee she collects.  She does not
necessarily  act  to  maximize  the  value  of  S, the  amount  the  class
recovers,  except  to  the  extent  that  doing  so  is  congruent  with
maximizing F.
The practical consequence of this constraint is that the court cannot
safely rely on the counsel to do what is best for the class.7  Obviously this
assumption only holds up to a point5"  The purpose of the assump-
54.  This  term  might  reflect  the  expected  value  of the  claims  in  different  modes  of
resolution, weighted by the probability of each mode's occurrence.  Thus, if there is no classwide
settlement,  the claims may be resolved through  individual  trials,  individual  settlements,  class
trials, or some combination; w would reflect the probability distribution and expected outcomes
of these different modes of resolution.
55.  I consider distributional matters in Part VII below.
56.  If this were not the case, then a court simply could never approve any class settlement.
57.  The potential divergence  in interest between counsel and class is of course the reason
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prohibit settlement of a class action without judicial
approval.  See FED.  R CIV.  P. 23(e)  (mandatingjudicial sanction as a matter of law).
58.  Ethical or reputational concerns may lead the class counsel to place the class's recovery
above her own.
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tion is to examine  the extent to which counsel's  incentives  diverge
from  those  of the  class  members,  and  the  extent  to  which  these
incentives may be aligned.  To that end, it is most useful to "assume
the worst" about the counsel's objectives,  in the sense that she is out
to maximize her return. 9
The second  constraint is that the  class members  have little or no
control  over  the  counsel's  actions  and  are  forced  to  accept  any
settlement the court approves.  In particular, it is assumed that many
class  members  cannot  generally  "opt out" of, or  otherwise  veto,  a
proposed  settlement.  The  assumption  of  class  passivity  seems
reasonable in many cases.'  Even if class members are formally given
the right to opt out of a settlement, they often lack the information
necessary to exercise the right when doing so would be in their best
interests.
The practical consequence of this constraint is that the court cannot
safely rely on the class to police the settlement amount. If the class members
were knowledgeable  enough to exercise a right to opt out, perhaps
the court would  not need  to worry  about the  case settling  for too
little, for the class members would not abide by a settlement that gave
them less than opting out would yield.  For purposes of analysis, the
class members are unable to protect themselves in this manner.
Third, it is assumed that when the court is called upon to approve
the settlement, it is uncertain about the aggregate value of the class's
claims  and possibly  the  amount  the  class  is  actually  receiving  in
settlement.  With regard to the aggregate value of the class's claims,
the  court  is  frequently  called  upon  to  approve  the  settlement  of
claims  that have not been extensively  litigated." 1  Because  the court
59.  This  is  a  widely  held  premise  in  analyses  of the  class  action.  See Janet  Cooper
Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 48  STAN.  L.  REV.
497, 574-76  (1991); John  C.  Coffee, Jr.,  The  Unfaithful Champion:  The Plaintiff  as Monitor in
ShareholderLitigation,  48 LAW & CONTEMP.  PROBS.  5, 26  (1985); Coffee, supra  note 16, at 686-89;
Koniak & Cohen, supra  note 4, at 1053-57; Kenneth Darn, Class Actions:  Efficiency, Compensation,
Deterrence,  and Conflict ofInterest 4J. LEGAL STUD.  47, 57 (1975); Macey & Miller, supra  note 16,
at 22; David Rosenberg, The Causal  Connection in Mass  Exposure Cases: A  "Public Law" Vision of the
Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 847, 890 (1984).  In Saylorv. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 900-01  (2d Cir.
1972),Judge Friendly stated that "the interests of the plaintiff in [a class action] suit and of his
attorney are by no means congruent."
This premise is also the basis for the extensive literature on the economics  of attorneys' fees
in ordinary litigation settings.  See Clermont & Currivan, supra note 16, at 534-37;  Miller, supra
note 27, at 193-95; Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Suzanne Scotchmer, Contingent  Fees for Attorneys:  An
Economic Analysis, 24 RANDJ. ECON. 343 (1993);  Murray L. Schwartz & DanielJ. B. Mitchell, An
Economic Analysis of the Contingent  Fee in Personal-Injuy Litigation, 22 STAN.  L. REV.  1125,  1136
(1970).
60.  Other authors have argued this at length.  See Coffee,  supra note 16, at 677-84; Macey
& Miller, supra  note 16, at 21.
61.  See supra note 32.
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has had little  opportunity to gather  information in such  cases, it is
highly uncertain  about the probability of success and the amount of
damages.  It therefore seems reasonable to assume that the court will
typically be uncertain  about the value of the class's claims in alterna-
tive proceedings.
Regarding  the  court's  assessment  of  the  amount  the  class  will
receive in settlement:  in many settlement agreements, the defendant
creates  a settlement fund from which plaintiffs will be paid.  There
may,  however,  be  rigid  eligibility  requirements  preventing  many
plaintiffs from collecting from the fund, with the defendant receiving
unclaimed  funds.62  The  court  may  have  difficulty  assessing  how
onerous the eligibility requirements will be in practice and thus will
have difficulty ascertaining how much will actually go to the plaintiffs
rather than back to the defendant.
6 3
The practical consequence of this constraint is that direct regulation
of the settlement amount cannot ensure that the settlement will give the class
the full value of its claims.  If the court knew both the value of the
class's  claims and the amount the plaintiffs would receive, the court
could simply refuse to approve any settlement that gave the plaintiffs
less than the value of their claims.  If, however, the court is uncertain
of the value  of the class's  claims, or if it has  trouble  assessing  the
amount that will actually be paid in settlement, then regulating  the
settlement amount will be prone to error.  Sometimes the court will
underestimate  the  value  of the  class's  claims  or  overestimate  the
amount  the  class  will  actually  receive,  and  therefore  mistakenly
conclude that the class is receiving the full value of its claims.
III.  THE BASIS  FOR FEE REGULATION
This Part examines the basis for judicial regulation of the fee class
counsel  recovers.  To  accomplish  this  objective,  the  preceeding
hypothetical  situation will  proceed under  the  assumption  that the
court will not regulate the fee.  Therefore,  assume  that in deciding
whether to approve a proposed  classwide settlement, the court only
scrutinizes the size of S, the settlement amount paid to the class, and
pays  no  attention  to  the  size  of F, the  amount paid  to  the  class
counsel.
62.  See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1418.
63.  See id  at 1377.  Settlements  consisting  of nonmonetary  relief also pose difficulties in
assessing the settlement's value.  SeeNote, In-Kind Class Action Settlements, 109 HARv. L REV. 810,
827 n.81  (1996).
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A.  Equilibrium  Settlements
Let us begin by examining the properties  of the settlements  that
will be reached if the court does not regulate the counsel's fee.  The
central  result  can  be  summarized  as  follows:  if  the court  does  not
regulate the  fee, class counsel and the defendant have an incentive to settle the
case on  terms that give the class members the minimum allowable amount.
The "minimum allowable  amount" is the smallest value of S that the
court is willing to approve.'
The essential  intuition underlying  this assertion is simple. 5  From
the standpoint  of the negotiating  parties  (the  defendant  and  class
counsel),  paying  the  class  any  increment  above  the  minimum
allowable settlement amount is wasteful, in that the negotiating parties
would  be  better off dividing  that increment  between  themselves.66
For this reason, any settlement involving a payment of more than the
minimum allowable  amount is inferior, from  the standpoint of the
settling parties,  to a settlement involving  the payment of the mini-
mum allowable settlement amount. Accordingly, if the settling parties
seek to maximize their  own welfare,  they will not agree  to give  the
class more than the minimum  allowable settlement amount.
Suppose, for example, that in a given case the minimum allowable
settlement  amount is  100.67  Consider a settlement  agreement  that
gives the class more than this amount:  the class will receive 110, and
the class  counsel  20.'  The payoffs  to the  settling parties  would be
as follows:
Defendant:  - 130
Class counsel:  20
Now suppose the settling parties consider a new agreement that would
divide the excess amount paid to the class,  10, between themselves on
a 50/50  basis. 6'  Their payoffs  under this  new arrangement  would
be:
Defendant:  - 125
Class counsel:  25
64.  For the sake of clarity, it is assumed that settling parties know this amount.
65.  For formal proof, see infra Appendix.
66.  Several authors have argued a similar point.  See POSNER,  supra  note 31, at 570; Macey
& Miller, supra note 16, at 25-26.
67.  See supra note 51  (discussing relevant units of measure).
68.  Thus, in this agreement, S = 110, and F=  20.
69.  Thus, in this new agreement, S = 100,  while F=  25.
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The latter arrangement  makes  both settling  parties better  off than
does the former.  In effect, each has made money at the expense  of
the class.  By this reasoning, it is clear that an agreement in which the
surplus  is  divided between  the settling  parties  improves,  from  the
perspective of the settling parties, any settlement agreement in which
the class receives some surplus  above  10.
This result is obtained whether or not the court selects class counsel
in advance.  This point may not have been sufficiently appreciated in
the past.  Intuition suggests that pre-settlement selection of the class
counsel is likely to lead to a more generous  settlement recovery for
the  class.  This  result underlies  criticism  of the  "settlement  class
action" device."0  Yet this intuition is mistaken, at least if there is no
regulation of the counsel's fee. 1  Absent regulation  of the counsel's
fee, the counsel, together with the defendant, rationally will choose
to settle the case for the minimum allowable amount.  Regardless of
whether  the  court pre-selected  the counsel,  she  has  no  economic
incentive  to  agree  to  a settlement  giving  the  class  more  than  that
amount.
Therefore, what difference does it make whether counsel is selected
in advance of the settlement negotiation?  The only effect is on the
fee paid  to the counsel  herself." 2  If counsel  is  chosen  in  advance,
the  defendant  faces  a monopolist;  the  defendant  cannot settle  the
case  except by reaching agreement with that counsel.  Accordingly,
the  defendant must pay  that counsel  at least  as  much  as  counsel
would receive  if there were no  class settlement.  In contrast, if the
counsel is not selected in advance, the defendant can "shop around"
for  the  lawyer  who  stands  to  gain  the  least  if there  is  no  class
settlement, and settle with her. 7
70.  This criticism is founded on the proposition that such pre-settlement selection prevents
the defendant from "shopping around" for the most compliant class member, or lawyer, in order
to secure the lowest possible settlement.  As a result, the class benefits in settlement if the class
counsel  is designated in advance.  See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1453-57.
71.  As will be demonstrated,  if there  is prdper regulation of the counsel's  fee,  advance
selection of the class counsel  makes no difference.
72.  For mathematical proof of this point, see infra  Appendix.
73.  These points can be illustrated with a variant of the earlier numerical example.  Assume
the defendant's expected loss in alternative proceedings is 200, and the minimum value of S the
court will approve is 100.  In addition, there is a set of candidates for class counsel.  Within that
set, some candidates will recover 10 in alternative proceedings, while others will recover 20. The
disparity  might represent  differences  in  the  quality  of  individual  claims,  or  alternatively,
differences in the size of the candidates'  claim portfolios.
Assume the court does not choose the counsel  in advance.  The defendant  will then settle
with one of the candidates who stands to recover 10, and the amount paid to the counsel  (P)
will be  10.  If any candidate demands more than 10, another candidate who  is willing to take
an amount closer to 10 will underbid her. Through this competitive  process, the value of Fwill
be bid down to 10.
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B.  Justification  for Regulating the Fee
Without fee regulation, then, class counsel has an incentive to settle
the case for the minimum value of S that the court will permit. 74  If
that is the amount the settling parties settle for, does it follow that the
class members  collect too little?
That conclusion would not follow if the court knew the value of the
class's  claims.  In such a situation,  as discussed previously, the court
could  simply  refuse  to approve  any settlement  giving the  class less
than that amount. 75  If the court is uncertain about the value of the
class's  claims,  however,  then  one  may  expect  the  class  members
systematically  to collect less than that amount.  This is true for two
reasons:  (1) biased estimations; and  (2)  adverse selection.
First,  the  minimum  allowable  settlement  amount  is
disproportionately likely to lie below the value of the class members'
claims.  The  defendant  and  class  counsel  have  a joint incentive  to
minimize the court's estimate of the value of the class's claims  and to
maximize  the court's  assessment  of the  amount being paid  to  the
class.76  Consider, for example,  the court's  estimate of the value  of
the class's claims.  The lower the court's estimate of the claim, the less
that the defendant must pay to the  class members.  A low -estimate
leaves  more  for the  defendant  and  class  counsel  to  split between
themselves.  To the extent that the settling parties can influence the
court's beliefs, one would expect a bias in the court's estimate of the
value  of the  class's  claims,  with  the  court  more  often  than  not
underestimating the value of the class's claims.77  For similar reasons,
one would expect the court to overestimate  the amount that actually
will  be  paid  under  a given  settlement.  If so,  then  the  minimum
Now suppose that the court chooses a counsel in advance.  This situation differs in potentially
two respects from the one just described.  First, it may raise the bottom of the settlement range;
if  the  court selects  one  of the  candidates  who  stands to  recover  20  in  the  event no  class
settlement  occurs,  then  obviously  the  value  of F will  not  be  less  than  20.  Second,  and
independent  from  the  first  point, it raises  the  top of the  settlement  range.  Because  the
defendant cannot seek competing bids,  the class counsel  may be able to hold out for a fee of
100.  The defendant is willing to pay up to 200  to settle the case.  The class must receive  100
of the settlement, with  100 remaining for the class counsel.
74.  Counsel  may, for reasons of principle or other factors, refuse to act on this incentive.
The critical point for present purposes is that the incentive exists.
75.  See supra  Figure 1 and accompanying text.
76.  As noted above, it  may be difficult for the court to ascertain  the value of the relief
offered  to the class.  See supra Part H.C.
77.  The  court, knowing  of this  incentive,  presumably  will discount  to some  extent  the
settling parties'  statements regarding its value.  Nonetheless, in an adversary system,  the court
has few sources of information regarding the case other than the parties themselves.  It is fair
to assume  that in  many cases the settling parties  can, through practices  such as  the selective
presentation of information, induce the court to underestimate  the value of the class's claims.
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settlement that the court permits will tend to be less than the value
of the class's  claims.
Second, class settlements will be drawn disproportionately from the
set of cases in which the minimum allowable settlement amount is less
than the value of the class's claims.  The reasoning here is simple:  If
the minimum  allowable  settlement  amount is  significantly  greater
than  the value  of the  class's  claims,  the  defendant  rationally  will
choose not to settle because he or she does better by foregoing a class
settlement and paying  the value  of the class's  claims  in alternative
proceedings.  By  contrast, whenever  the minimum  allowable  settle-
ment amount is less than the value of the class's claims, the defendant
(and counsel)  will be  happy to settle.  The upshot  is that, roughly
speaking, when  the court overestimates the value of the class's claims,
the  class  collects  the value  of its  claims  because  there  is  no  class
settlement." 8  When  the court  underestimates  the value  of the  class's
claims, however, the class  collects less than that value because  there
is a class settlement. As a result, at least on average,  the class collects
less than the value of its claims.  This should occur even if there is no
bias in judicial estimations of the value of the class's claims. 7 9
IV.  EFFECTS  OF FEE  REGULATION
A.  Capping  Counsel's Fee
In  a  world  without  fee  regulation,  there  is  an  inverse  relation
between  the  amount  collected  in  settlement  by  the  class  and  the
amount collected by counsel.  That is the lesson of the analysis in Part
III:  Every dollar that is  not given  to the  class  can be split between
counsel  and the defendant."  Counsel  thus shares  the defendant's
incentive to minimize the amount paid to the class members.  This is
the principal  rationale for having courts scrutinize and regulate the
terms of the fee paid to the  class counsel in class settlements.
One  option  for  the  court  is  to  regulate  the  fee  so  as  to  link
counsel's recovery to the attorney's performance on the class's behalf.
More  specifically,  the  court could  limit  counsel's  fee  to a specified
78.  To be sure, litigation costs and risk aversion may lead the defendant to settle even when
the  minimum  allowable  settlement amount  is  greater  than  the  value  of the  class's  claims.
Nonetheless, if the minimum allowable settlement is above a ceiling amount, the defendant will
not settle.  There  is, however, no corresponding floor on  the minimum allowable settlement
below which the counsel will not settle.  Even if the minimum allowable value of S is zero, the
settling parties will be happy to settle.
79.  A similar analysis applies  to errors in judicial assessments of the amount being paid to
the class.
80.  See supra Part IMI.B.
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fraction (or multiple)  of the  class  recovery.  Under  this  form  of fee
regulation,  the  court  allows  counsel  to  collect  only  some  fixed
percentage-termed  the fee percentage--,of the amount paid to the
class.  Expressed  symbolically, the  court declares  that counsel's  fee
must satisfy the following expression:
F  _  cDS,
where
=  the fee cap, that is, the maximum percentage  of the
class's  recovery that counsel  is  allowed  to collect as
his or her fee.
Thus, for example, if D  = .25, counsel's fee cannot exceed one-fourth
of the amount actually paid to the  class members.  In other words,
the class  members must receive  at least four  times as  much  as  the
counsel herself." 1
It is important to emphasize that for a fee cap to function effective-
ly, the court must not permit counsel to collect any other compensa-
tion in  the  case  or any  other payment  from the defendant.  Class
counsel may have contracts with some of the class members entitling
the attorney  to some  share of the class  member's recovery. 8 2  Class
counsel  must  surrender  these  rights  under  the  contracts  as  a
condition for becoming  class counsel; if counsel  does not, then the
fee cap will not work.  In addition,  counsel must not receive money
from the defendant on other cases apart from the class action.  Under
current practice, class counsel may sometimes concurrently represent
(1)  the  class  and  (2)  other clients,  excluded  from  the  class,  with
claims against the defendant.  An obvious temptation for the settling
parties is to enter an agreement in which the latter claims are settled
on relatively advantageous  terms, while the class's claims  are settled
for a relatively small amount. 8"  For the fee cap to work, this arrange-
ment must be prohibited.
Percentage-based  fees  are  widely  employed  by  courts  in  class
actions. 8 4  Courts  have  not,  however,  examined  the  problem  of
determining what fee cap is needed to ensure that the  class receives
81.  In addition,  the court-to  counteract  any problem  in assessing  the  true size  of the
settlement-can specify that counsel collect only as money is actually paid to the class members.
82.  See Resnik et al., supra note 46, at 338;  see also Coffee, supra  note 2, at 1375.
83.  See Coffee,  supra note  2,  at  1373-74  (discussing role  of attorney  representation  in
inventing settlement collusion context).
84.  See Miller, supra  note 12, at 23.
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the full value of its  claims in settlement.'  Such  is  the  task in the
following analysis.  To lay the foundation for that analysis, one must
consider the relations between the choice of a cap, the selection of a
counsel, and the outcome of the settlement process.
B.  The Fee Cap's  Effects on Settlement Behavior
How does introduction of a fee cap affect the equilibrium outcome
of settlement negotiations?  Its central effect is to induce counsel to
demand more for the class than she would if the fee was unregulated.
By tying counsel's recovery to that of the class, the fee cap eliminates
the  inverse  relation  (that  obtains  when  the  fee  is  unregulated)
between  the  amount  paid  to  the  class  and  the  amount  that  class
counsel  is  paid.  This  much  is  obvious  and  is  a  well-recognized
principle in other settings. 8 6
What  is  perhaps  less  obvious  is  that  this  effect  becomes  more
pronounced as the fee cap is lowered.  More precisely, the smaller the
fraction of the class's recovery that counsel is permitted to collect, the
more counsel will demand in settlement on behalf of the class if all
else is  equal.87  To  see this  point, recall  that counsel will not agree
to any settlement that gives the attorney less than the amount that she
would receive if the parties  did not agree  to settle.'  If the fee  cap
is very low, then S must be relatively large in order to induce counsel
to accept the settlement.  In this way, setting a relatively low fee cap
counteracts  counsel's incentive to settle for the minimum allowable
settlement amount.
89
The net impact on the settlement behavior of the parties  can be
summarized  as follows:  The lower the fee cap, (1)  the lower the likelihood
of a class settlement; and (2) the greater  the amount collected by  the class
members in the  event  of settlement. 9 "  These  crosscutting  effects  arise
85.  See Resnick et al., supra  note 46, at 339-45.
86.  The virtues of tying the agent's recovery or profit to that of the principal is familiar not
only in lawyer-dient settings but all principal-agent arrangements.  SeePAUL R. MILGROM  &JOHN
ROBERTS,  ECONOMICS,  ORGANIZATION  AND MANAGEMENT  214-16  (1992).
87.  One  qualification  here is  that this point may  hold if the  parties  are asymmetrically
informed about the value of the class's claims.  See infra  Part VI.
88.  See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
89.  Consider the following numerical example.  Suppose that, if  counsel does not settle with
the defendant, then the attorney expects to earn 20; and suppose that the minimum allowable
settlement amount is 100.  If (D  is less than 20%, then counsel will not agree to a settlement that
fails to give more than 100 to the class; counsel will not agree to a settlement in which F<  20.
A settlement giving the counsel that much will be allowed by the fee  cap only if (DS >_20.  If 4D
is less than 20%,  the only values  of S satisfying that  inequality are greater  than  100.  Thus,
choosing a fee cap below 20% ensures that if the case settles, the settlement amount is greater
than the minimum allowable settlement amount.
90.  Conversely, raising the fee cap has the opposite effects.
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from  the  fact  that  lowering  the  cap  has  the  effect  of  increasing
counsel's minimum demand in settlement.  The more that counsel
insists on recovering in settlement, the less appealing settlement will
be in the defendant's eyes.  If counsel's demands get large enough,
the defendant will simply forego a class settlement entirely. If a settle-
ment is reached, however, then the class will take  away more than  it
otherwise would have, precisely because  counsel has held out for a
relatively large settlement.
TABLE  1
Numerical Example:  Effects of Adjusting the Fee Cap
Minimum value  Maximum value  Width  of
of S acceptable  of S acceptable  settlement
Fee cap  to counsel  to defendant  range
33%  60  150  90
25%  100  160  60
15%  133  173  40
10%  200  181  -
Note.  - Counsel's  expected  gain in  the event  he does not settle  is 20.  The  defendant's
expected loss in the event it does not settle with the counsel is 200.  See footnotes 91 and 93
for an explanation  of how each column is calculated.
Table  1 provides a numerical example of these crosscutting effects.
Suppose again that counsel  expects to earn 20 if he or she does not
settle with  the defendant.  Assume,  in addition,  that the defendant
expects to lose a total of 200 if it does not settle with counsel.  Table
1 indicates  the  parties'  bargaining  positions  under  four arbitrarily
chosen  fee  caps.9  As  the  Table  indicates,  the  bottom  of  the
settlement range-counsel's  minimum demand-rises as the fee  cap
falls.92   By  contrast,  however,  the  width  of  the  settlement
range"-the  set  of  mutually  acceptable  settlement  amounts-
contracts  as the fee cap falls.94  Observe that if the cap is set at 10%,
there  is no mutually acceptable  settlement amount. 95  If we  assume
91.  Counsel will reject any settlement unless (DS2 20.  Rearranging terms, we see that the
minimum value of S acceptable  to the counsel is given by 20/(; this figure is indicated  in the
second column  of Table  1.  The  defendant  will reject  any settlement unless  S +  cDS  200.
Again, rearranging terms, we find that the maximum value of S acceptable  to the defendant is
given by 200/(1--'1); this figure is listed in the third column of Table 1.
92.  See Table 1.
93.  That is, the width of the settlement range is the extent to which the maximum amount
the defendant is willing to pay exceeds the minimum amount the counsel is willing to accept.
This figure is obtained by subtracting  the second column  in Table  I from  the third column.
94.  See Table 1.
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the court is uncertain  about what the parties stand  to gain or lose
from alternative proceedings, then it follows that lowering the fee cap
has the effect of reducing the likelihood that the settlement range is
of positive width." 6  This reduces the probability that settlement will
be feasible.
The implication of this result is that the court faces  a trade-off in
regulating counsel's fee.  If the fee cap is set too high, the case will
settle but the class members will recover too little in the settlement.
If the  fee  cap  is  set too  low, however,  then there  will be  no  class
settlement at all. Finding the right fee cap forces the court to balance
these risks. 7
C.  Ex Ante  Versus Ex Post Effects of the Fee Cap
The effects just described  bear on the size and likelihood of the
settlement  negotiated by class  counsel.  These are  so-called  ex  ante
effects, in that class counsel bases her settlement demands on the fee
cap that she anticipates will later be applied.9"  Another effect of the
fee cap, of course, is that it determines how the settlement proceeds
are  actually  divided between  the  class  members  and  class  counsel.
This distributional impact is an ex post effect, in that it arises after the
settlement has occurred.  It is important to distinguish these ex ante
and ex post effects.  In particular, it is  crucial to see that the fee cap
affects how a settlement is divided between class members and  class
counsel, as well as the size of the settlement itself
It would be a mistake for a court, in setting the fee cap,  to focus
exclusively  on  the  distributive  consequences  of a  given  cap,  while
ignoring its incentive  properties.  The reason  is simple:  A fee  cap
that seems  perfectly  reasonable  in  terms  of its  ex post distributive
qualities  may  nonetheless  have  disastrous  ex  ante incentive  effects.
This  point  will  emerge  with  greater  clarity  later,  after  we  have
analyzed  the structure  of the optimal fee  cap.9"  For now it suffices
to illustrate the point with the above  numerical example.
96.  Counsel's minimum demand must be less than the defendant's maximum offer for the
parties  to  reach  a  settlement.  The  lower  the  value  of 0,  the  closer  these  two  figures  will
be-meaning that there is less "margin for error" in the event the court is wrong about what the
parties stand to gain or lose from alternative proceedings.  Given the uncertainty of the court's
perspective,  the lower the value of 0,  the less likely that this precondition  for settlement will
hold.
97.  See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
98.  See infra  Part V.C; see also POsNER,  supra  note 31, at 570.
99.  See infra  Part V and Appendix Part D.
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Returning to the example in Table  1, assume that the value of the
class's  claims in alternative proceedings  is  180.1'  Suppose  that the
court sets  the fee cap at 33% of the  class members'  recovery."'  In
purely  distributional  terms,  this  may  seem  an  entirely  appropriate
share to give class counsel.  It approximates the share generally given
by courts to class counsel, and indeed is smaller than the share taken
by the  lawyer  in  private fee  arrangements. 02  Yet permitting  class
counsel to take that percentage encourages  the attorney to settle for
much  less  than  the  class's  claims  are  worth. 03  To  prevent  class
counsel from settling for less than the value of the class's claims, the
fee  cap  must  be  significantly  less  than  this  seemingly-reasonable
figure."  In  this  sense,  the  optimal  fee  cap, judged  ex  ante, may
differ  substantially  from  what  may  seem  reasonable  in  ex  post
terms.
10 5
V.  THE  OPTIMAL FE  CAP
The focus of the analysis now becomes  choosing the  optimal  fee
cap, viewed  ex ante.  The optimal fee cap is defined  as follows:
(D*  =  the value of (D that induces class counsel to
demand the settlement that provides  the class
members with the value of their claims.
More precisely, (D*  is  the fee ceiling that brings counsel's minimum
demand  as close as possible to, but not below, the value of the class members'
claims.
100.  This is not inconsistent with our earlier assumption that the defendant's expected loss
from an alternative proceeding is 200.  In addition to the 180 owed (in expected terms) to the
class,  the defendant can be assumed to face litigation costs of 20 if it does not settle.
101.  This is the same as decreeing that class counsel collect one-fourth of the total amount
paid by  the defendant to settle  the case.  If the  class receives three-fourths,  and  class counsel
one-fourth of the amount paid by the defendant, then counsel's fee is equal to 33% of  what the
class members  collect.
102.  Several studies have shown that fee awards in class action settlements tend to give class
counsel between 20% and 30% of total amount recovered from the defendant, or, equivalently,
between 25% and 42% of the net amount paid io the class.  See I CONTE, supra note 12, at 50.
Contingent fees in personal injury litigation generally run in the same range.  See Bruce L. Hay,
Contingent Fees and Agency  Costs, 25 J. LEGAL  STUD.  503, 525-27  (1996);  Bruce L.  Hay,  Optimal
Contingent  Fees in a World of Settlement, 26J. LEGAL  STUD.  287, 299-300  (1997)  (citing studies).
103.  Counsel is willing to agree to a settlement giving the class members 60, which is only
one-third of the value of their claims.  See supra  Table 1.
104.  More  precisely,  it must lie between  10%  and  15%  of the amount  taken  by  the  class
members.
105.  See Hay, supra note 18, at 482.
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The  value  of (D* represents  a solution  to  the  trade-off problem
facing  the  court." 06  The  court wants  to  set  (D sufficiently  low  to
ensure that counsel will not enter into a settlement that gives the class
members  less  than  the value  of their claims.  The  court, however,
does not want to set (D  so low as to prevent the case from settling at
all.  In essence,  cD*  is the highest cap that the court can impose while
still ensuring that the attorney will not settle for less than the value of
the class's claims.
A.  Basic Structure of the Optimal  Fee Cap
What is  the  optimal fee  cap for a given  counsel?  For  clarity  of
exposition, the analysis will proceed under three assumptions.  It is
assumed:  (1)  that negotiating  a classwide  settlement and going to
alternative  proceedings  are  equally  costly  (in  terms  of  time  and
expense) to class counsel;  (2)  that class counsel does not systematical-
ly underestimate  or overestimate  the value of the case;  and  (3)  that
class counsel is risk-neutral.  After analyzing the optimal fee cap under
these  conditions,"  we  will  consider  the  significance  of  relaxing
these assumptions.
If counsel is designated in advance of settlement bargaining, then
the optimal fee cap for the attorney acting as class counsel is given by
the following fraction:
Attorney's expected recovery in
alternative  proceedings
Class members' expected recovery in
alternative  proceedings
The  reasoning  behind  this  solution  is  simple.  The  minimum
amount that counsel  will  settle for is  an  amount that provides  the
value of what the attorney expects  to receive in alternative proceed-
ings.  If the fee cap is  set at the above fraction, then he or she will
not settle for an amount less than the aggregate expected recovery in
alternative  proceedings.  That leaves  the  class  members  with  an
amount  (at least)  equal to  the aggregate  expected  recovery  minus
counsel's expected recovery.
106.  See supra  notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
107.  See infra  Appendix Part D.
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The above  numerical  example illustrates the point.  Suppose  that
the class's expected  recovery in alternative proceedings  is  180,  and
counsel's expected recovery is  20.  If the fee cap is set at 11%  (that
is,  the  fraction  20/180),  then  the  minimum  settlement  to  which
counsel will agree is  one where  180  is paid to the class."' 8  Thus,  in
this example, the optimal fee cap is  D*  = 11%.  A fee cap any higher
might lead to a settlement below 180.
Matters  are more complicated  when counsel  is not designated  in
advance.  The  complicating  factor  is  that a  candidate's  minimum
settlement demand depends not only on what she expects to earn if
the case does not settle, but also on what she expects to receive if the
defendant settles with a different candidate.  If counsel is not designat-
ed in advance, then the optimal  fee cap for class counsel is  demon-
strated  by  either  the  previous  fraction  or  the  following  fraction,
whichever is less:
Attorney's expected recovery in a
settlement negotiated by another candidate
Class members' expected recovery in a
settlement negotiated by  another candidate
If there is more than one possible candidate,  the optimal  cap is the
one for which  the above  fraction  is smallest.  This explains why the
court must compare the two fractions in the proposition.
The central insight behind this result is that if the fee cap is larger
than the second fraction, then being class counsel is advantageous  to
a candidate-that is, a given settlement provides more to class counsel
than  to other candidates.  If being class counsel is  advantageous  in
this  way, then  candidates  will  seek  to  underbid  each  other in  the
settlement offers they make to the defendant.  The court accordingly
must set the fee cap lower than both of the above fractions to ensure
that the class does not collect less than the value of its claims.
Let  me  illustrate  this  with  a  variant  of  the  above  numerical
example.  Consider  some  candidate  X  who  expects  to  get  20  in
alternative  proceedings if there is  no class  settlement.  Assume  the
defendant  can  settle  with  either  X  or  some  other  candidate  Y
108.  From the previous footnote, we know that counsel will not agree to a settlement unless
S > 20/0.  See supra note 107 and accompanying text.  Plugging  1 = 0.11 into this expression
yields S > 180.
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Suppose  that X expects  the  court  to set (D equal  to  11%  if she  is
counsel; but suppose that, if Yis  counsel, X expects to receive  some
smaller fraction-say, 6%-of the settlement.  It is easy  to see that X
may be willing to settle for less than the value of the class's  claims.
Suppose Yoffers the defendant a settlement in which S = 180.  Rather
than allow that deal to be made, X is  better off attempting to settle
for  a  lower amount.'"  Furthermore,  if  Y  is  in the same  predica-
ment  as  X11°  then  the  candidates  will  bid  their  way down  to  the
minimum allowable settlement amount. 1'
The  only way  for  the  court  to  prevent  this  cycle  of  downward
bidding  is  to  eliminate  the  pecuniary  advantage  enjoyed  by  the
candidate who becomes  class counsel.  To do this, the court should
make (D no greater than the latter fraction above.  A given candidate's
fractional  share of a settlement that she herself enters into must be no
greater than  counsel's fractional  share  of a settlement  that a rival
candidate  enters into. Thus, in the above numerical example, it follows
that X should get only  6%  of any settlement that she  enters  into,
because Xwould get only 6% of a settlement entered into by  Y  More
generally, if the latter  fraction  is  smaller  than  the  former, then  (D
should be set equal to the latter fraction.
If, however, the latter fraction is larger than the former, then the
court should set (D  equal to the former fraction.  Interestingly, in this
scenario  the optimal fee  cap encourages  candidates  to  avoid being
counsel, because a given settlement most handsomely rewards  those
who  are  not class  counsel."'  Each  candidate  will  be  tempted  to
overbid  the  other, so  as  to  maneuver  the  other  into  being  class
counsel.  Nonetheless,  the  optimal  fee  cap  is  equal  to  the former
fraction; for if the fee cap is higher than that, the case may settle for
less than the value of the class's  claims.
B.  Properties of the Optimal  Fee Cap
The optimal fee cap has been defined with the primary objective of
assuring that the  class  members  receive  at least  the value  of their
claims  in  the  event  the  case  settles.  A  secondary  objective  is  to
109.  If Ys offer is accepted, Xgets 6%  of the resulting settlement; if Xoffers a slightly lower
settlement  amount-175, for example-that  is  accepted,  then  X gets  11%  of the  resulting
settlement.
110.  That is, if the fraction  Yreceives from a settlement negotiated by Xis smaller than the
fraction receives from a settlement that she herself negotiates.
111.  Should Yoffer more than that amount, Xwill have an incentive to underbid Y,  and vice
versa.
112.  For example,  suppose that for X  the latter fraction is 15%  while  the former remains
11%.  Rather than settle for a given amount, Xwould prefer to see  Ysettle for that amount.
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enable, to the extent possible, the case to settle on a classwide  basis.
The  question  naturally  arises:  To what extent are  these  objectives
complementary?  Put  otherwise,  is  a  classwide  settlement  feasible
under the optimal fee cap?  As this Article  has shown, settlement is
feasible if the defendant's maximum offer-the most he is willing to
pay-exceeds  the counsel's minimum demand." 1
Analysis of the parties'  bargaining positions under the optimal fee
cap yields the following result:  When the court employs an optimalfee cap,
settlement is always  feasible if the counsel is designated  in advance; but it may
be  infeasible if  the counsel is not designated in advance.  If counsel  is
selected in advance,  the defendant's  maximum offer always exceeds
counsel's minimum demand when the court employs the optimal fee
cap.  This is not necessarily true, however, if counsel is not designated
in advance.  If the court employs the optimal  fee cap,  there may be
no candidate  whose minimum  demand is  less than the defendant's
maximum offer.
The  intuition  behind  this result  is  quite  straightforward.  When
counsel  is  designated  in  advance  under  the  optimal  fee  cap,  the
minimum settlement amount that counsel will accept is one that gives
the class members the value of their claims and provides counsel with
her  expected profit from  alternative  proceedings.  That settlement
amount is,  by definition,  less than the  total amount the defendant
expects  to lose if there is no class settlement.  So long as the parties
expect  the court to employ the optimal fee  cap, settlement  will  be
feasible.
Matters  are  more  difficult  when  counsel  is  not  designated  in
advance.  The fee  cap  may  have  to be much  lower  than would  be
appropriate if counsel  were designated  in advance.  The reason for
setting such a low fee cap, once again, is to prevent a downward spiral
of bidding among the candidates.  The result of setting the fee  cap
so  low, however, is  that  the minimum settlement that any candidate will
accept  exceeds  the  maximum  settlement  that  the  defendant  is  willing to
pay.
114
Thus, in cases where class counsel is not designated in advance, the
two  identified  objectives  of  fee  regulation  are  not  necessarily
compatible.  In particular, this quandary arises when candidate Xgets
only a relatively small fraction of any settlement negotiated by some
other candidate  Y  If that fraction  is sufficiently low, there is no fee
113.  See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
114.  The  earlier numerical  example, where  the  optimal  fee  cap  was found  to  be  1/17,
illustrates this point. As we know from Table 1, settlement is infeasible when the fee cap is this
low.
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cap that can both make settlement feasible and ensure that the class
members get at least the value of their claims.  In such cases, using
the  optimal  fee  cap-as  defined  in  this  Article-prevents  a  class
settlement altogether."5
C.  Refinements to the Basic Structure
One must now consider the consequences of relaxing the assump-
tions  employed  in  describing  the  basic  structure  of the  optimal
cap." 6  Table  2 summarizes the results.
TABLE 2
Effects of Different Factors on the Optimal Fee Cap
Effect on the
Factor  Optimal Fee Cap
Relative  cost to the attorney of alternate proceedings
Attorney optimism toward alternate proceedings  +
Attorney risk aversion
Note. - "+" means that the factor is positively correlated with the fee cap, so that increasing
(decreasing)  the factor has  the effect of raising  (lowering)  the optimal fee cap; "--"  means
that the factor is negatively correlated with the optimal fee cap, so that increasing (decreas-
ing) the factor lowers  (raises)  the optimal fee cap.
(a) Litigation Costs. Sometimes alternative proceedings will be more
costly  to  counsel  than  negotiating  a  classwide  settlement" 7  In
other  situations,  alternative  proceedings  will  be  less  costly  than
negotiating  a  classwide  settlement""  How  does  this  affect  the
analysis?  If alternative proceedings are more costly than negotiating
a  classwide  settlement, then  the  optimal  fee  cap  will  generally  be
lower than it is in the basic analysis above."9  All  else being equal,
the greater the costs counsel must bear in the alternative proceedings,
the less  profitable  those proceedings  will be for the  attorney-and
115.  A corollary is that if such cases settle on a classwide  basis, the parties do not expect the
court to use the optimal fee cap.  Then  there are no  assurances  that the class members  are
receiving the value of their claims.
116.  See Appendix Parts D-E.
117.  This is true, for example, when the alternative proceedings  consist of a class trial led
by the counsel negotiating the settlement.  SeeDaniel R Walteher, ClasszddeArbitration  and 10b-5
Claims in the Wake of Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,  74 COPNELL L. REV.  380,
395 (1989).
118.  This  may be true in the context of a settlement class  action.  For a given  lawyer who
represents  a small number of clients,  the  alternative  to negotiating a classwide  settlement is
simply  to settle the  cases  of her  clients.  That  process may  be significantly  less  costly  than
negotiating a classwide settlement.
119.  In addition, the more costly alternative proceedings  are relative  to negotiating a class
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counsel will settle the case for less.  To counteract this effect, the fee
cap must be lowered to boost counsel's minimum settlement demand
to the appropriate level.
Conversely, if alternative proceedings  are less  costly than negotiat-
ing a classwide  settlement, then the optimal  fee cap  will  be  higher
than it is in the basic analysis above.  The greater the costs of settling,
the more tempting it will be to go to alternative proceedings if all else
is  equal.  Accordingly,  counsel  will  make  a  very  high  settlement
demand, perhaps thereby preventing settlement.  To counteract this
effect, the fee  cap must be raised  to lower  the  attorney's minimum
settlement  demand  to  the  right  level,  thereby  making  settlement
feasible.
(b)  Information.  Perhaps counsel  will systematically underestimate
or  overestimate  the  value  of  the  class's  claims. 2'  How  do  these
possibilities affect the optimal fee cap?  If counsel underestimates the
value of the case, then she obviously will tend to demand too little in
settlement.  This effect may be counteracted by lowering the fee cap.
If, however, counsel overestimates  the value of the case, then she will
tend to demand too much in settlement.  This effect may be counter-
acted by raising the fee cap.
(c)  Risk  Aversion.  Finally,  one  must  consider  the  class  counsel's
aversion  to risk."'  Analytically, risk aversion is analogous  to increas-
ing the relative  litigation  cost of the riskier  (less  certain)  course  of
action  available  to the  attorney.  Accordingly, the above  analysis  of
litigation  costs  applies  to  risk  aversion.12  Assuming  that the  out-
come  of alternative  proceedings  is  riskier or less  predictable  than
negotiating  a  class  settlement,  then  the  presence  of attorney  risk
aversion  implies  that the optimal  fee cap  is lower  than it would be
otherwise.
1 2-
120.  In matters where the defendant has private information, there arguably is a bias toward
systematic underestimation  of the case's value by counsel.  The argument is roughly as follows.
If counsel  overestimates  the value  of the  case,  then the  defendant will correct the  counsel's
belief.  If, however, counsel underestimates the value of the claims, then the defendant will not
correct the  counsel's  estimate,  because such  an error  dearly  benefits  the  defendant.  Even
though  discovery  rules  apply,  one  assumes  that  the  defendant  cannot  be  more  or  less
forthcoming  in  the  discovery  process.  Favorable  information  might be  buried -in a  pile  of
documents,  while unfavorable  information might be placed in a brightly colored folder.
Research  in  cognitive  psychology,  however,  suggests  that  litigants  systematically  tend  to
overestimate  the value  of their  case.  See Linda Babcock  et al., Biased Judgments of Fairness  in
Bargaining,  85 AM.  ECON. REv.  1337 (1995).
121.  The presence of such risk aversion  depends, roughly speaking, on the extent to which
the attorney's fortune is bound up with the case (or, equivalently, how large a stake counsel has
in the outcome  of the case).  In general,  the larger the attorney's  stake in the case, the more
reluctant counsel  will be to gamble.
122.  See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
123.  Likewise,  the more risk averse the attorney is, the lower the fee cap.
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The preceding factors may drive the optimal fee cap below or above
the  point  prescribed  by  the  basic  structure  derived  earlier.  In
combination, these factors may push in opposite  directions and may
cancel  each  other  out  to  some  extent. 24   There  is  no  reason,
however, to suppose that these factors will offset completely.  Accord-
ingly, the basic structure of the optimal fee cap can only be regarded
as an approximation  of the actual optimal fee cap.  The approxima-
tion is useful nonetheless, as it at least provides us with a sense of the
order  of  magnitude  of the  optimal  fee  cap.  As  the  subsequent
analysis  will show, that order of magnitude  may be  smaller than  is
generally suspected.
VI.  IDENTIMNG THE  OPTIMAL FEE  CAP
Having examined the abstract structure of the optimal fee cap, the
analysis now turns to the issue of identifying the optimal fee cap in a
particular case.
A.  The information  problem
The basic structure of the optimal fee cap reveals what approximate
fraction of the settlement class counsel should recover to induce the
attorney  to settle for the right amount.  The obvious  pr6blem  this
raises  is  how  the  court  can  acquire  the  information  needed  to
evaluate  that fraction  in  a given  case.  In  particular, the question
arises:  To evaluate the fractions defined above, does the court need
to know the value of the expected recovery in a given  case?
If the  answer  to  that question  is  yes,  then  the derivation  of the
optimal fee cap is useless, for it assumes  away the very problem that
it  is  supposed to address.  After all, if the court knew the  expected
recovery in a particular  case, it could directly infer the value  of the
class's claims."  Then, the court would no longer need the indirect
method of fee regulation to ensure that the class members receive the
value of their claims because it could simply refuse  to approve  any
settlement  that  gave  the  class  members  less  than  the  expected
recovery.  The premise of the fee regnlation analysis is that the court
does not know the value of the terms in the fractions.
124.  For example,  these factors might push in opposite directions if alternative proceedings
would be less costly, but more risky, for class counsel  This might be true in settlement class
action  settings, where  an attorney might take  on  a much larger client base  in negotiating  a
classwide settlement than she would have in alternate proceedings.  The lower costs push the
fee cap up, while risk aversion pushes it down.
125.  Recall that the value of the class members'  claims is given by (Aggregate ixpected iryovey
in alterative  proceedings) - (Counsel's  expected recoveiy in altemnative  proceedings).  See supra  Part VIA
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The  issue  that must  be  investigated,  therefore,  is  the  extent  to
which  the  court  can  evaluate  the  fractions  in  Part  V.A  without
knowing  the value of the  terms in the  fractions.  One  possibility is
that these fractions are independent of the expected recovery in the
case.  If so, the court may be able to estimate the optimal fee ceiling
without knowing the expected recovery.
B.  An Approach to the Problem
Central  to  the following  analysis  is  the standard  contingent  fee,
which gives the lawyer a fixed fraction of the recovery.  This arrange-
ment frequently governs counsel's recovery in the event she does not
negotiate  a  class  settlement.  Its  fixed  quality-the  fact  that  the
lawyer's  cap  is  to  some  extent  independent  of  the  size  of  the
recovery-may enable the court to assess the optimal fee cap, even if
it does not know the expected recovery in the case.
To illustrate the point, it may be helpful to begin with an example
outside the class action context.  Assume a lawyer represents a client
under a contingent fee arrangement that gives the lawyer  one-third
of the  total  recovery in  the case.  Disregarding  litigation  costs, we
know that the ratio between the lawyer's expected recovery and the
class members'  recovery is  one-half.2  To determine  this ratio,  the
court need not know anything about the size of the expected recovery
in the case; the fee arrangement provides the pertinent information.
One  can use this reasoning to assess  the fractions  in Part V.A.
If counsel is designated in advance, the optimal fee cap is estimated
by the following product:
Counsel's share of the claims  x  Fee-compensation ration
in alternative  proceedings  in alternative  proceedings
The multiplicand refers to the value of the attorney's fractional share
of the overall set of claims in the class if the case had gone to alternative
proceedings.  It  is  the proportion  of claims  counsel  would handle  if
there  were  no class  settlements  in settlement  negotiations.127  The
multiplier represents the ratio between  what the attorney would  get
and what the client would receive in each claim the counsel handles,
provided there were no class settlement. 28
126.  The  lawyer receives  one-third  of the  recovery, and the  class gets the  remaining two-
thirds.  This  creates a ratio of one-half.
127.  Thus, for example, if counsel's clients' claims  represent 1/100 of the value  of the all
claims in the class,  then the attorney's share of the cases is 1/100.
128.  If these figures vary among clients, then the court must use an average figure.
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To  see  that  the  above  expression  yields  the  optimal  fee  cap,
consider the  following numerical  example.  Suppose  an  attorney's
share  of the  claims  is  one-tenth,  and  the  ratio  of this  fee  to  the
client's  net  recovery  is  one-third."2   Assume  further  the  class
members would receive some amount  Win alternative proceedings.
The attorney will not settle  the case on terms that provide  less than
she expects to receive  in alternative proceedings, which is  W/30.  If
the court sets her fee cap at 1/30, then counsel will not settle for less
than  W.  As  a result, the  class  members  will  receive  at least  W in
settlement-which is what they would have been awarded, in expected
terms, in alternative proceedings.
If the  counsel is not designated in advance, the optimal fee cap is
approximated  by  either  the  above  expression  or  the  following
product, whichever is smaller:
Counsel's share of the claims  x  Fee-compensation ratio
in another's settlement  in another's settlement
The multiplicand refers to what the attorney's fractional share of the
overall set of claims in the  class would have been, if another attorney
had negotiated a classwide settlement.  That  is, it is  the proportion  of
claims counsel would handle if another attorney had represented the
class in settlement negotiations.  The multiplier represents  the ratio
between  what  the  attorney  would  get  and what  the  client  would
receive, in each  claim that counsel  would have handled, if another
attorney had negotiated a class settlement."3
C.  The Court's Informational  Task
The foregoing analysis furnishes the court a means for assessing the
optimal fee cap in a particular case without necessarily estimating the
expected recovery in the case.  The question then becomes whether
a court can determine  the value of the terms defined in Part VI.B
without knowing the expected recovery in a case.
Suppose  the  attorney  has  been  retained  by  fifty  of  the  class
members.  The  court  wants  to  know  what  fraction  these  claims
constitute  relative  to  the  overall  set  of  claims.  To  estimate  this
fraction, the court needs two pieces of information.  First, it needs to
129.  This  would  be  the  case  if counsel  had  a  25%  contingent  fee.  Under  such  an
arrangement, the lawyer receives one-fourth of the recovery, leaving three-fourths for the client;
the ratio is accordingly one-third.
130.  This  may  or  may  not  be  identical  to  the  fee-compensation  ratio  in  alternative
proceedings.
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know how many claims there are, or how many members constitute
the class.  Second, the court needs to know the extent to which  the
claims of the attorney's clients resemble those of other class members.
Suppose, for example,  that there are a total of 5,000 class members.
If the attorney's clients possess claims that are indistinguishable from
those of the remaining class  members,  then the attorney's share  of
the total claims amounts to 50/5000, or 1/100.  If counsel's  clients'
possess  claims that are stronger than average for the class,  however,
then the attorney's share exceeds  1/100;  the expected recoveries  of
these  clients  are  greater  than  1/100  of the  class's  total  expected
recovery.  Similarly, if the  claims  of these  clients  are  weaker  than
average,  then  the  attorney's  share  of the  total  claims  is  less  than
1/100.
Both of these pieces of information  may be  difficult to  ascertain.
Consider,  for  instance,  a  class  action  involving  claims  for  future
injuries.  The  court  may  possess  only  a rough  idea of how  many
claimants will  appear.1'  Furthermore, because the claims  have not
yet arisen, it may be difficult for the court to determine how closely
these  claims will resemble  those of the attorney's  existing clients." 3 2
Indeed, the fact that so  little is known  about these future claims  is
one reason why the court may have trouble estimating the total value
of the class's  claims.  Even so, the court's  informational  task is less
onerous than estimating the expected recovery of all claims, because
the court does not have to guess at the odds of recovery or the likely
amount of recovery.
Estimating the ratio between the lawyer's fee and the client's net
recovery  raises slightly different informational issues.  Courts should
not experience much difficulty in determining the nature of the fee
arrangement  between  the  lawyer  and  her  clients.  The  problem,
however, is that the lawyer's cap of the recovery is often a function of
the  size of the recovery."3  If so,  then  the  court cannot  precisely
determine the fee ratio without knowing the expected recovery.  For
example, assume  that the fee arrangement  gives the lawyer  30%  of
the first  100 recovered,  25%  of the next 100 recovered,  20%  of the
next  100  recovered,  and  15%  of any  amount  above  that.  If the
131.  See McNeill v. New York City Hous. Auth., 719 F. Supp. 233, 252  (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
132.  For example,  claims  may vary in  the amount  of damages sustained  and evidence  of
causation  of injury or contributory  negligence.  See Robert  G. Bone,  Statistical Adjudication:
Rights,  Justice, and Utility in a World of Process  Scarcity, 46 VAND.  L. REv. 561,  572  (1993).
133.  This is true both of private fee agreements and court-established  fees for class action
trials.  See generally Charles  Silver, A  Restitutionay Theory of Attoneys'Fees in  Class Actions, 76
CoRNELL L. REV. 656  (1991).
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expected  recovery  is  200,  then  the fee-compensation  ratio  will  be
0.38;11 but if the  expected  recovery  is  400,  then  the ratio  will  be
0.29.13
It is impossible to calculate a priori the degree of error in judicial
estimations  of the fee-compensation  ratio.  It seems  reasonable  to
assume, however, that estimating the attorney's contingent fee is less
error-prone than estimating the expected judgment in the case.  For
example, suppose that in a given  case the judge underestimates  the
expected judgment by a factor of two.  Such a mistake is unlikely to
translate  into an  error  of comparable  magnitude in estimating the
attorney's contingent fee.l "6
D.  Sample Applications
This  Article  now  delineates  how the model would prescribe  the
optimal fee cap in different types of class action settings.
1.  Trial  class actions
The  easiest  cases to  analyze are  those in which a class  has  been
certified  for  trial  in  a  single jurisdiction 37  before  completion  of
settlement  negotiations.  For our purposes,  the  critical  features  of
such  cases  are  generally  the  following:  (1)  the  class  counsel  is
selected  in advance;  and  (2)  the attorney's  "share of the claims"  is
simply one, or 100%; that is, counsel will be taking her contingent fee
from each of the claims in the class action.
Applying the analysis under these circumstances is straightforward.
Assume  that the  "alternative  proceeding" in the  event there  is  no
classwide settlement is a single,  classwide  trial, which will determine
both the defendant's liability and the total damages paid to the class.
The optimal fee cap is simply equal to the fee-compensation ratio that
would obtain if the case went to trial.  Thus, if class  counsel would
receive some given fraction of the class recovery in the event that the
case  were  to go  to trial, then  counsel should  also receive  no  more
134.  The lawyer gets 0.3(100)  + 0.25(100)  = 55; the client gets 200-55 = 145; and 55/145 =
0.38.
135.  The lawyer gets 0.3(100)  + 0.25(100)  + 0.2(100) + 0.15(100)  = 90; the client gets 400 -
90 = 310; and 90/310 = 0.29.
136.  In the above example, suppose the judge estimates the expected  recovery to be 200,
when in fact it is 400.  In such a case, the judge will  estimate  the attorney's fee to be 27.5%,
when in fact it is 22.5%.
137.  If there are several "competing" class actions, each with a different lead counsel, then
class  counsel  effectively  has  not been  designated  in  advance,  because  the  defendant  can
negotiate with each of the different lawyers.
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than  that fraction  of the class recovery in a settlement  that she  has
negotiated.
Matters are a bit more complicated, though essentially similar, if the
"alternative proceeding"  consists  of a classwide  trial  only on certain
common  issues.  Suppose,  for  example,  that  if there  is  no  class
settlement, then there will be a classwide trial on issues relating to the
defendant's conduct, followed  (if necessary) by a series of individual
trials  on  issues  concerning  each  claimant's  conduct  and  damages.
Assume further that class counsel will act as attorney in the classwide
trial, but that different lawyers will serve as counsel in the individual
trials.  The court's task is to estimate the fraction of each claim that
class counsel would receive if the case did not settle before a classwide
trial.  That fraction  is the optimal fee cap.
2.  Settlement class actions
The analysis  will now  focus  on class actions  that are certified  for
settlement  purposes  only.  In  such  cases,  if there  is  no  classwide
settlement,  claims  will be  resolved  on an  individual  rather  than  a
classwide basis.  For these purposes, the critical features of settlement
class  actions are that:  (1) the class counsel's share of the claims  in
alternative  proceedings  is  typically  less  than  100%;  and  (2)  the
counsel is not designated  in advance  of the settlement negotiation
process.  These  features  significantly  affect  the  optimal  fee  cap
analysis.
First, they affect the attorney's  share  of the claims  in alternative
proceedings.  Typically, no single lawyer will have been retained by all
the- members  of the  class."a  Indeed, no single  lawyer's  client base
will be more than a small fraction of the class  as a whole.  As a result,
the  appropriate  fee  cap  for  a  lawyer  who  negotiates  a  classwide
settlement will be only a small fraction of the contingent fee cap that
she has agreed on with clients.
Table  3  provides  a  numerical  example  of how  low  the fee  cap
plausibly may be in certain cases.  Suppose a given lawyer negotiates
a classwide settlement.  This table indicates  the optimal fee cap for
the lawyer, given the attorney's share of claims and the contingent fee
that she  expects  to  earn  on  each  claim." 9  Assume,  for example,
that the  lawyer  has  ten  clients  who  are  in  the  class,  and that  the
lawyer is working on a one-third contingent fee on those claims.  In
138.  See supra note 10 and accompanying  text; Deborah  L.  Rhode,  Class  Conflicts in Class
Actions, 34 STAN.  L. REv. 1183,  1192  (1982).
139.  We  assume  in this  example that the  contingent fee  is the  same whether the  case  is
resolved in alternative proceedings or in a classwide settlement negotiated by some other lawyer.
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this  case,  counsel's share of the client's recovery is  equal to 50%.1 °
If the class consists of 10,000 members, then the lawyer's share of the
claims is roughly 1/1000.  The optimal fee cap is then 0.05%, or 1/20
of 1%.
TABLE 3
Numerical Example:  Optimal Fee Caps in Settlement Class Actions
comFeation  Attorney's  share of claims
ratio  1/10  1/100  1/1,000  1/10,000
.5  D*  =  5%  O*  =.5%  D*  =  .05%  D*  =.005%
.33  3.3%  .33%  .033%  .0033%
.25  2.5%  .25%  .025%  .0025%
.1  1%  .1%  .01%  .001%
The reason  the fee  cap  is so  low in"  this example  is  simple:  the
smaller the attorney's share of the claims, the less that she has to gain
from  alternative  proceedings.  As  a  result,  all  other things  being
equal,  counsel will be willing  to settle  the case for a relatively small
amount.  For instance,  an  attorney with  a share  of 1/1000  of the
claims  has  much  less  to  gain  in  alternative  proceedings  than  an
attorney who has 100% of the claims.  All else being equal, therefore,
counsel will be prepared to settle for much less than she would if the
attorney  had  100% of the  claims.41  To  counteract  that tendency,
the court must impose a very low fee cap, so as to induce counsel to
demand a relatively large settlement.  Counsel will then receive a very
small fraction of this larger settlement.
The fact that the representative  is not designated by the court in
advance of the settlement negotiation can  also alter the  analysis.  It
changes  only if the lawyer's contingent fee in a classwide settlement,
negotiated by a different lawyer, is lower than counsel's contingent fee
in alternative proceedings.  As the previous examination demonstrat-
ed, the court needs to use the lower of the two in calculating the fee
cap.
14
140.  The  fee  gives  the  lawyer one-third and the  client two-thirds of the recovery,  so the
lawyer's share is equal to half of the client's total recovery.
141.  For further discussion of this point, see Hay, supra note 18, at 487-90.
142.  See supra Part VA
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VII.  SUBCLASSES AND  DISTRIBUTIONAL  CONCERNS
To this point the focus has been on the amount paid in settlement
to the class as a whole, without regard to its distribution among class
members.  The discussion  now turns  to  how  the settlement treats
different groups within the class.
A.  The Problem of  Distribution
Critics of class action settlements often assert that settlements  may
favor  some  groups  within  the  class  at  the  expense  of  others.
1 41
Thus,  for  example,  in  a mass  tort setting,  a  settlement  might  be
relatively generous to claimants who have already brought suit, while
leaving  little  money  available  for  future  claimants."'  Generally
stated,  the criticism  holds  that a settlement  may  give  members  of
group  A  in  the  class  the value  of their  claims,  while  denying  the
members of some other group B the fair value of their claims.  This
Part considers the extent to which fee caps can address this problem.
To  examine the issue, it is necessary to make  a simple revision  of
the settlement model to capture the notion of subclasses.  Suppose a
settlement  takes the form  of a schedule  (Sa,  SB,  P),  where  a  is  the
amount  paid  to subclass  A  in  the  class;  S'  is  the  amount  paid  to
subclass B; and Fis the amount paid to class counsel.  The court seeks
to ensure, if possible, that each subclass collects the expected value of
its claims in alternative proceedings.
This  objective  differs from  the earlier formulation  of the court's
objective insofar as the court is not concerned simply with the size of
the  overall  settlement amount paid  to the  class members  after the
counsel's fee  is deducted.  Rather, the court is  also concerned  with
how that payment is  divided  among the  two  subclasses.  Thus, for
example, suppose that the overall settlement amount collected by the
class exceeds the expected value of the class'  claims, and that the full
amount is distributed to subclass A.  From the court's perspective, this
is  a bad outcome, because  matters  would be better if each  subclass
collected  the value of its claims from the distribution.  The question
arises, then, as  to what extent the court can use a fee cap  to ensure
that each subclass  receives the value of its claims.
143.  See  Morawetz,  supra note  1,  at  5-7;  see  also John  C. Coffee,  Jr.,  The  Regulation of
Entrepreneurial  Litigation: BalancingFairness  and  Efficiency in the Large Class  Action, 54 U.  CHI.  L.
REv. 877, 916  (1987).
144.  See Coffee, supra  note 2, at 135-55.
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B.  Effects of the Optimal Fee Cap
The fee  cap  examined  in  the foregoing  analysis  limits  counsel's
compensation  to a figure equal to some fraction of the amount paid
to the  class as  a whole.  Thus, if the fee cap  is set, say, at 10%  the
counsel collects no more than ten cents for every dollar received by
the class itself, regardless  of whether that dollar goes to members  of
subclass A or instead to members of subclass B.  A natural threshold
question  is  how such a fee cap affects bias  on the part of the class
counsel and the defendant to favor a particular subclass.  One arrives
at the following result:  If the class counsel receives the same cap of the
amount recovered by each subclass, then the settling  parties have no incentive
to give a greater  settlement amount to one subclass than to any other. More
precisely, the settling parties have no reason to prefer giving a dollar
to subclass A rather than giving a dollar to subclass B.
The reasoning behind this result is fairly  obvious.  The defendant
is  indifferent  to paying  a  dollar to A  and paying  a dollar  to B;  in
either case, the defendant pays a dollar.  In addition, class  counsel's
situation is  the same; the attorney receives the same fraction of that
dollar no matter which subclass it goes to.  For example, the settling
parties will be indifferent between a settlement that gives 50 to A and
100  to  B, and  a settlement that  gives  100  to subclass  A and 50  to
subclass B.  The  defendant's  total payment, and the counsel's total
recovery, are the same under either settlement.  Thus, they have no
reason to prefer one over the other.
The  next  result  follows  logically  from  this  point.  Recall  the
definition of the optimal fee cap:  the fee cap that ensures that class
counsel will not accept a settlement unless it gives the class as a whole
the value of its claims.  Assume that the court identifies  the optimal
fee cap  accordingly, and suppose further that this fee cap applies to
the recovery paid to each subclass."4  In general,  application  of the
optimal fee cap  will have  the following  effects:  (1) relatively  small
subclasses  will  receive  more  than  the  value  of their  claims;  and
(2)  relatively large subclasses will receive  less than the value of their
claims.
146
To see why this occurs, suppose that subclass A's claims have a total
value  of  100,  while  those  of subclass  B  have  a  total  value  of  50.
145.  If the fee cap is 10%, then counsel receives  10% of the amount paid, no matter how
the remainder is divided among the subclasses.
146.  The reference here is not to the number of claimants in the subclass, but to the value
of its claims  relative to other subclasses.  Thus, by "relatively large," we mean that the value of
the subclass's claims is greater than that of other subclasses.
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Assume that the optimal fee induces class counsel to demand no less
than  150 in  settlement.  For  reasons set further above,  the parties
have no incentive  to give one subclass more than the other subclass;
both the defendant and the class counsel will be inclined to accept
any settlement involving a total  class recovery of 150.  In effect, the
settling parties will choose randomly among settlements  totaling 150.
On average,  then, each subclass  will tend to collect 75-meaning A
collects  too little while B collects too much.
The court may reject a settlement that does not, in the court's view,
fairly  apportion  the  recovery  among  subclasses.14 7   The  threat  of
such judicial  intervention  may  motivate  the  settling  parties  at the
apportioning  stage.  Once  again,  however,  the  court's  ability  to
directly regulate  the terms of settlement is constrained by its limited
information;  the  court  may  not  know  the  relative  sizes  of  the
subclasses, and it cannot tell whether a given subclass should get 50
or  100.  In  addition,  the  court may  not be  able  to  ascertain  the
subclasses'  relative shares of the settlement, as it cannot tell whether
a given subclass is in fact getting 50 or 100.
For  these  reasons,  the  above  generalization  captures  the  likely
tendency of class action settlements, though there is no way of knowing
the magnitude of that tendency. The court cannot verify directly that
each subclass receives the value of its claims, and the optimal fee cap
gives  the settling parties  no incentive  to  achieve such an apportion-
ment.  As defined in this Article, the optimal fee cap will do no better
than ensure that the class as a whole receives in settlement the value
of its claims.  It cannot solve distributional problems within the class.
C.  The  Judicial  Dilemma
If the premise that the optimal fee cap cannot address distribution
issues  is  true,  is  the  derivation  of  the  optimal  fee  cap  a failure?
Perhaps  the optimal fee cap should be  redefined for cases where  a
settlement agreement allocates payments among different subclasses.
The new definition might be as follows:  The optimal fee cap ensures
that each subclass-not just the class as a whole-receives  the value
of its claims.
Unfortunately, such  a fee  cap  does not exist.  The point  can  be
summarized  as follows:  If counsel represents more than one subclass, then
no fee cap can ensure that each subclass receives the value of its claims in
settlement.  More precisely, if counsel  (or a candidate  for the  role of
147.  See generally Moore  & Cohn, Federal Class Actions-urisdiction  and Effect ofJudnent, 32
U. ILL. L. REv. 555,  555-67  (1938).
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counsel) negotiates a settlement that binds more than one subclass,
there is no fee cap the court can apply that will both make settlement
feasible and ensure that each subclass receives the value of its claims.
Any fee  cap  that makes  settlement feasible  will also, by its nature,
make it  possible  for a subclass  to receive  less than  the value of its
claims.
This result was apparent with uniform fee caps-fee caps that give
counsel  the  same  cap  of  the  amount  paid  to  each  subclass."
Under that type of fee cap, the settling parties will care only about the
size of the total settlement paid to the  class without regard  for the
allocation  among  subclasses.  Thus, if the settling parties  agree  on
some aggregate  settlement amount, then they wil  be happy to give
the whole amount  to A,  while  leaving  nothing for B.  Alternatively,
they will also be happy to  give the whole amount to B, while leaving
nothing for A.  The imposition of a uniform fee cap cannot prevent
either result.
What about a non-uniform fee  cap?  Such a fee cap-whereby the
counsel's fraction of the settlement depends on whom the settlement
is  paid to-introduces  a positive  bias in  favor  of one subclass.  In
particular, it encourages  the settling parties  to distribute the entire
settlement (or as much as possible)  to the subclass for whom the fee
cap is highest.  For example, suppose that the fee cap is structured to
give the counsel  10% of the amount paid to subclass  A, but 20%  of
the amount  paid  to subclass  B.  It is  easy  to  see  that the  settling
parties will give as little as possible to subclass A.  For each dollar paid
in settlement, the class counsel would rather see that dollar go to B
than to A,  and the defendant is indifferent between giving the dollar
to A or B.  If possible, the settling parties will give the whole amount
toB.
Thus, neither uniform nor non-uniform fee  caps  can ensure  that
the  settling  parties  will  give  each  subclass  the  value  of its  claims.
Uniform  fee  caps  make  the  settling  parties  indifferent  about
distributional  issues, while non-uniform  fee caps  bias the parties  in
favor of some subclasses  over others.  Whether indifference or bias is
preferable  is  unimportant  for  present  purposes.1"  The  critical
point is that no fee cap provides the settling parties with an incentive
to distribute a settlement among subclasses according to the value of
each subclass's claims.
148.  See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
149.  Sometimes the court may want to bias the parties in favor of some subclasses.
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The source  of the  problem  here is  that  class  counsel  represents
more than one subclass.  The court may, of course,  counteract  the
problem  by giving  each  subclass  its  own  counsel,  each  financially
independent of the  others, and each with  the authority to  reject a
settlement  on behalf of the subclass  she  represents. 5  The  court
would then derive a fee cap for each counsel, in accordance with the
analysis  in  Parts  V  and  VI  above.  This  would  be  the  counsel's
exclusive compensation, and there would be no sharing of fees among
counsel for different subclasses."'  Acting under that fee cap,  each
counsel would refuse any settlement that provided her subclass with
less than the value of its claims in alternative proceedings.
The  drawback  to  such  an  approach  is  that  it  multiplies  the
complexity of negotiating a classwide settlement. Giving each subclass
its own counsel, with veto power over settlement, introduces problems
of coordination and strategic bargaining that are less prevalent when
the  entire  class  is  represented  by  a  single  attorney.'52  In  a  case
where multiple attorneys  represent various subclasses,  the odds of a
classwide settlement drop accordingly.  This Article does not address
whether  the  benefits  of  individual  counseling  outweigh  these
problems.  It is enough to observe that, once again, the court faces a
tradeoff between the goal of encouraging a classwide settlement and
the  goal of ensuring  that class  members  receive  the value  of their
claims.
CONCLUSION
The importance of fee caps for the protection of the class members
in settlement  obviously depends on the constraints identified at the
outset of the  analysis;  the more  binding  these  constraints  are,  the
greater the need to use fee regulation to give class counsel the proper
incentives.  Thus,  if the  court  lacks  the  information  necessary  to
evaluate the propriety of a settlement, and if class members lack the
ability to police its soundness, 153  then imposing the appropriate  fee
cap will be relatively critical.  If the court and the class members can
evaluate  the settlement accurately, then  setting the appropriate  fee
cap will  be less  pressing.  These other protective  devices  are  rarely
150.  If counsel  is  not designated in  advance,  then  the  court  would  have  to  prohibit  a
candidate from negotiating on behalf of more than one subclass.
151.  Thus, counsel for subclass A could not pay counsel for subclass B to induce the latter
to accept a settlement.
152.  See Robert  G. Bone, Personal  and Impersonal Litigative  Forms:  Reconceiving the Histmy  of
Adjudicative Representation,  70 B.U. L. REv. 213,  215-20 (1990).
153.  One way that class members might police the soundness of the settlement is by opting
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perfect, however, so the problem of designing  appropriate incentive
structures for class counsel will be a-significant task for courts in most
cases.  This  Article  furnishes  a  framework  for  approaching  the
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APPENDIX
A.  The Model
Assume  there  are  n candidates  for  class  counsel.  Define  the
following notation:
Si  - Amount received  by the  class  members  in  a settle-
ment negotiated by the ith candidate;
F  - Amount  received  by  the  counsel  in  a  settlement
negotiated by the ith candidate.
We  assume,  except  in  section  E  below, that settling  generates  the
same costs to the counsel as alternative proceedings; that the settling
parties  are  symmetrically  informed;  and  that  candidates  are  risk-
neutral.
B.  The Basis for  Fee Regulation
Here  we derive  the results presented in Part IVA of the text.  To
determine  the amount recovered by the  class members,  consider  a
settlement entered into by the jth candidate.  Let
- Minimum allowable  settlement."
We  will  show that any schedule  in which  Sj >  S is pareto-inferior  to
one in which S. =  S.  Consider some settlement schedule  (S, F1)  such
that Sj > S.  Now, in place of that schedule, substitute a new schedule
(S, F) such that S + Fj =  Sj +F  This equality implies (because Sj > S)
that F > F  As a result, class  counsel will strictly prefer  the second
schedule  to the first, while the defendant will be indifferent between
them.
Now consider the sum recovered  by counsel as her fee.  We have
seen that in any settlement reached, S = S.  Thus, the only matter for
the parties to bargain over is the size of F.  Let
154.  It is assumed that this variable  is independent  of who the  counsel  is.  Relaxing this
assumption has no  effect on the qualitative conclusions  of the analysis.
14761997]  FEE REGULATION  IN CLASS  ACTION SETrLEMENTS
Gi  - The ith candidate's anticipated profit from the case
if she does not reach a settlement with the defendant
(G> 0);
H  Defendant's expected loss in alternative proceedings.
(1)  Suppose  counsel is designated in advance by the court.  Assume
the jth candidate is selected.  The minimum value of F,  acceptable to
the counsel  is  Gf;  the maximum value  of Fj acceptable  to the defen-
dant is H- S.  We thus have  Gj_  Fj <__H- S.  (2)  Now suppose counsel
is not designated in advance.  The defendant can, in effect, conduct
a reverse auction among the candidates, settling with the low bidder.
Let candidates  k and I be, respectively, the candidates who stand to
gain  the  least  if  they  fail  to  settle  with  the  defendant. 5  The
defendant will settle with  k, because  k will be the lowest bidder; and
in equilibrium, the defendant will not pay more than the minimum
amount acceptable  to  4 because if k demanded more than that, she
would be underbid by  .156  We thus have  G  <--  F <  G 1.
C.  Effects of a Fee Cap
Here we derive the results presented in Part IVB the text.  Let
- Fee cap applied to the ith candidate in the event she
settles with the defendant  (D  > 0).
The fee  cap is binding on the settlement negotiations, in the sense
that  (F S)  will be  chosen in such  a way that the equality F1  =  DiSi
holds.157
Counsel  will not agree  to  any value  of S unless  CD,.  >  G..  From
inspection,  it is  clear  that j's minimum  settlement  demand  on  S
increases  as  Dj  decreases.  Regarding  the  likelihood  of settlement,
observe that the defendant  will not agree  to any  settlement unless
(1+(D)S  _ H.  Thus, settlement is infeasible because there is no value
of S  acceptable  to both parties if
155.  More precisely,  (r <  G  <  GC  for all i ;' {,}.
156.  These  points follow from  the  well-developed  literature  on  auctions.  See,  e.g.,  Paul
Milgrom,  The Economics of Competitive Bidding. A Selective Survey,  in SOCIAL GOALS  AND  SOCIAL
ORGANIZATION  261  (L. Huirwicz et al. eds.,  1985).
157.  To see this, it suffices  to show that any schedule where F<  O(S + 1)  is pareto-inferior
to one in which F= C(S +.F).  Consider some settlement schedule  (S, 1), together withaa ceiling
(D,  such that F<  cD(S+  fi).  Now, in place of that schedule, substitute a new schedule (Sj)  such
that  F= ((S+  1).  This  equality  implies that S< S because  Fhas been  held constant.  As a
result, the defendant will strictly prefer the second schedule  to the first, while class counsel will
be indifferent between  them.
1477THE AMERIcAN  UNIVERsrIY  LAw REvIEw  [Vol.  46:1429
Gj'"  (Al)
D  <
H-Gj
Assume  that the court is uncertain  of the value  of the terms on the
right-hand  side  of  (Al).  As  the value  of c1, goes  up,  so  does  the
probability that (Al) does not hold; hence, raising (D has the effect
of increasing  the  likelihood  (from  the  court's  perspective)  that
settlement is feasible between the parties.
D.  The Optimal  Fee Cap
Here we derive the results presented in Part VA of the text.  Let
Wi  C  lass members'  net expected  recovery from  defen-
dant on all  claims  the class in alternative  proceed-
ings,  net of the expected amount  taken  by the  ith
candidate.
The court's objective is to ensure that S. > W for all candidates.  Thus,
(D-4  is the fee cap that ensures  that the ith candidate  will not settle
unless Si>  Wi.
Suppose  the jth candidate  is designated  class counsel in advance.
Let
a  - Fractional share of WI  that the  ith candidate would
recover in alternative proceedings  (0-5 a _<  1).
By definition, we have aiWi =  Gi.  If D =  oj, then j  will not agree  to
a settlement unless  S  1  W.  Thus, %*  =
Now suppose no counsel is designated in advance.  Let
Pi  --  The  ith candidate's fractional share of a class settle-
ment negotiated  by  a different  candidate  (0  P :5
1).
159
We will examine the candidates'  behavior in Nash equilibrium.  Begin
by considering some candidate  I's best response to the actions of the
other candidates.  If no candidate  k offers  to settle for less  than the
158.  Expression  (Al)  is obtained by rearranging  terms in  the counsel's  minimum demand
figure and, the defendant's maximum offer figure.
159.  Thus, if candidate j negotiates a settlement Sj,  then candidate  i gets Aj.
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defendant's  reservation  price,"6  then  I will be  willing  to  settle  for
any amount that gives her more than aW. Thus, counsel's minimum
demand on S will be at least W if
0 1:  a.  (A2)
Suppose,  however, that some  other candidate  k  offers  to settle  for
some  amount  Sk  that  the defendant  will  accept  unless  I makes  an
equal  or lower  offer.  In  such  a  case,  I will  match  the  offer  (and
undercut it by a tiny amount)16'  if and only if f 1jSk  < (IS h. Thus, if
S  is acceptable  to the defendant, lwill refrain from undercutting the
offer if
01  _<  P1.  (AS)
From this analysis it follows that if both (A2) and  (A)  hold for all
candidates,  then  there  is  no  Nash  equilibrium  in  which  the  case
settles for less than S = W 62  If, instead, either  (A2) or (AS)  fails to
hold for some candidate (s),  then the case may settle for less than W
For example, if (A2)  fails  to hold for the kth candidate, the above
analysis  implies  the existence  of such  an  equilibrium."6  Similarly,
if (AS) fails to hold for the kth candidate, counsel may in equilibrium
agree to settle for less than  W. 11
The solution  to  the  court's  problem  is  therefore  to  choose  the
maximum fee cap that satisfies both (A2)  and (A).  Choosing that
ceiling,  rather  than  a  lower  one,  maximizes  the  chances  that
160.  That is, the defendant's reservation price is the amount the defendant stands to lose
in alternative  proceedings.
161.  If PjSk < d(DS,  then it is assumed there exists some lower settlement amount S such that
162.  To see this, suppose k's strategy is to agree to a settlement Sk < W. From the above, no
candidate will match or undercut Sk  As a result, k can improve her position by insisting on a
larger settlement figure.  This action makes k better off, whether or not the defendant agrees
to the larger figure.  By assumption,  DkS k < akW.  As between settling for  Sk and not settling at
all, candidate  k is better off not choosing to settle.
163.  One such equilibrium occurs when  k agrees to settle forjust above  [a.W(1 - 0  1/  t
and the other candidates demand some higher amount.  It is easily verified that no candidate
has any  incentive  to  change  her strategy in  such an  equilibrium,  and that in  the  resulting
equilibrium the class collects less than (1-a)  W.
164.  Indeed, if (AS) fails to hold for several candidates,  the unique equilibrium may be one
in which the candidates bid their way down to the minimum allowable settlement amount, S.
To see this, assume  (A)  does not hold for either candidate  k or L  Consider any strategy pair
(S,  S)  such that the defendant accepts S,,  Because  (AS)  does not hold, we know that from k's
standpoint, strategy is dominated by a new Sk' such that the defendant accepts Sk.  Seesupranote
162.  By parallel reasoning,  I will want to underbid &. It follows that no equilibrium  can be
sustained when the class receives more than S in settlement
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settlement will be feasible, while ensuring that the settlement amount
will not be below W.  Thus, (D*  = min (a,  0).
E.  Pmperties of the Optimal  Fee Cap
Here we derive the  results of Part V.B in the text.  Suppose  Oj* =
aj.  Plugging that into  Dj  =  Gj,  and recalling that G = ajW, we  see
that settlement is feasible provided that (l+aj) W 5 H, which is true by
assumption.  Suppose, instead, that (D*  = O3j.  Plugging that into cIjSj
= G, we see that settlement is feasible if f3j < ajW/H,  which may or may
not hold.
E  Additional  Factors  Bearing  on the Optimal  Fee Cap
Here  we  derive  the  results  presented  in  Part  V.C  of  the  text.
Assume that  F,* is the optimal fee cap for the jth candidate when the
model's assumptions hold.  For brevity's sake, we assume j is designat-
ed in advance.  The analysis  is similar, but more involved,  if counsel
is not designated in advance.
(1) Litigation  Costs. Let  -denote the jth candidate's litigation costs
in alternative proceedings  (J  < W).  In such a case, we have  Gj = ajW-
X..  Plugging that into  DS) = G,  and setting Si  - W  we have
D  <  (A4)
The fee cap must satisfy  (A4),  or candidate j will be willing to settle
for less than W.  Observe that (A4)  is less than a,  provided that  . is
positive.
(2)  Attorney Beliefs.  Let  Wj'  represent the jth candidate's estimate
of the value of  W.  The candidate's  minimum settlement  demand
satisfies  DjS  = ajWj.  Setting S  equal  to  WI  gives (Ij*  =  ajWj/W.  If
W,'  <  W, then (D,*  < aj.
(3)  Risk Aversion.  To consider the effect of counsel  risk aversion,
assume that some risk attaches to the outcome of alternative proceed-
ings,  and  that  counsel  is  risk-averse.  We  can  let  - denote  the
disutility sustained by j, which she would not sustain if risk-neutral,
from  going  to  alternative  proceedings.  The  analysis  in  (a) then
applies directly.
G.  Identifying the Optimal  Fee Cap
Here we derive the results presented in Part VI of the text.  Let Q.
denote the ith candidate's fraction of the total claims  (0 < Q< 1); let
/  ' denote  the  ith candidate's fee-compensation  ratio  in  alternative
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proceedings  (0 < Ra <  1); and let  .S denote the  ith candidate's fee-
compensation  ratio in  a  class  settlement negotiated  by a  different
candidate  (0  </M <  1).  By definition, we have  ai =  Q  A9, and P. =
QS.  We  can then  apply the  analysis from section D of this Appen-
dix.165
H.  Subclasses and the Problem of Distribution
We  now  derive  the  results  presented  in  Part  VII  of the  text.
Assume,  without  loss  of  generality,  that the  class  consists  of  two
subclasses A and B. Suppose further that the defendant is bargaining
with the jth candidate.  Let SA  denote  the total settlement  paid to
subclass A; let  DjA  denote the fee cap applied to the amount recov-
ered by subclass A;  and use analogous notation for subclass B.  The
defendant's  total payment is  given  by (1+DA)Sa+(l+cDj)S  ,  and the
class counsel's total recovery in settlement is given by 0jSa+DjSB.
Begin by considering  the relative treatment of the two  subclasses
under the optimal (unitary) fee cap.  (1) Suppose, first, that (D=  tIf.
Consider some  schedule  (A,  P)  that is  acceptable  to both settling
parties.  The settling parties will be indifferent among all settlements
(Sa,SB)  satisfying Sa+SB _P+.  If all such settlements are permissible,
then none of these settlements are more likely than any other to be
selected.  Thus,  in  expected  terms,  we  have  SA  =  SB  =  /(§+§).
(2)  Suppose,  next, that W  >  WV.  We know from the above that (in
expected terms)  S' =  S' when  DA  = (Df.  It follows that under ()*,  we
have  Wt - SA >  WV  - S .  Thus, under  1*, subclass  A will receive less
than subclass B, relative to the expected value of its claims.
Next, consider the structure of the optimal fee cap.  (1)  Consider
a unitary fee cap.  Assume that (DA  =  1f.  Consider any schedule  (P,
S)  that is acceptable to both settling parties.  The settling parties will
be indifferent  between  that schedule  and a  new schedule  (a,  $8)
where  A  =  0 and $B  =  A +  &B.166  For this  reason, it is evident that
there  is  no  way  of assuring  both  that  Sa  >  Wt  and that  S" >  WV 3.
(2)  Now  consider  a non-unitary  fee  cap.  Suppose  that  <C  (Df.
Consider  any  schedule  (&,  S)  that  is  acceptable  to both  settling
parties.  An argument analogous to the one above indicates that there
is  some  other  schedule  ($,  $)  where  $'  =  0,  as  to  which  the
defendant  is  indifferent  between  the  two  schedules,  while  class
counsel  strictly prefers the latter.  Thus,  so long as  S'  > 0,  there is
165.  See supra Appendix Part D.
166.  More generally, the settling parties may be willing to enter into a settlement that gives
subclass A the minimum amount allowed by the court.
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some other settlement schedule  that gives less to subclass  A,  and is
pareto superior from the standpoint of the settling parties. 167
167.  More  generally,  the  unique  equilibrium  is one  in  which  subclass  A  receives  the
minimum amount allowed  by the court.